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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to study the Nordic high yield green bonds and their performance
in the secondary market from 2019 until today, with a focus on the crisis following the
outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The analysis is conducted by constructing and
backdating an index of Nordic high yield green bonds, which is then compared to two
carefully selected benchmark indices. The index construction is based on Barclays’ index
methodology.
Using common measures of risk-adjusted return and single-factor CAPM regressions,
the analysis finds that green bonds show greater resilience during the period of market
turmoil in 2020. However, when one of the benchmarks is reweighted to match the
sector composition in the Green Bond Index, the higher returns are no longer statistically
significant. When the market liquidity, measured by the average relative bid-ask spread,
is analysed, a similar pattern is discovered. The average relative spread for the high yield
market excluding oil-related sectors is higher than the average relative spread for green
bonds. Still, the difference is lower when adjusted for the sector composition in the green
bond market, indicating that green bonds are more liquid than conventional bonds.
The thesis finds that the main reason for the observed outperformance, measured by risk
and return, can be attributed to the sector composition of the green bond market. We
can therefore not conclude that the returns and liquidity are higher solely because the
bonds are labelled as green.
Keywords – Green bonds, high yield, index construction, climate change, sustainable
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The purpose of this thesis is to study whether Environmental, Social, and Governance
factors (ESG) affect the price and performance of bonds in the Nordic high yield market.
We do this by comparing the attractiveness and performance of corporate green bonds
to the overall high yield corporate bond market. After researching the motivation for
sustainable investing in the Nordic market, we believe that green bonds need to display
competitive risk and return behaviour for the asset class to grow and help to reorient
financial flows away from fossil fuel towards climate-friendly projects. To increase our
understanding of this subject, we have created what is, to the best of our knowledge,
the first corporate green bond index available for Nordic investors. In doing so, we
aim to ease the task of benchmarking the performance of corporate green bonds against
prevailing economic trends. An index will allow us to compress the performance of multiple
corporate green bonds down to a single time series, giving us an idea of the overall average
performance of the bonds. This will again enable us to broaden our understanding of the
asset class as a whole, and as we can compare the risk and returns of the index against
other indices, better comprehend their pecuniary competitiveness, and their co-movement
with the overall market.
When we compare our index to carefully selected benchmark indices, we will better
understand whether Nordic investors will benefit from including green bond positions
in their portfolios and whether the asset class is useful for hedging portfolio risks and
minimizing downside risk. Intrigued by research on the financial benefits of holding
sustainable assets, we raise two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the Green Bond
Index outperforms the benchmarks in terms of higher risk-adjusted returns and better
liquidity. The second hypothesis is that Nordic green bonds held up better during the
market turmoil caused by the Covid-19 crisis. Our findings can potentially boost the
interest in environmentally friendly portfolios and help shape private incentives to mobilize
the financial resources necessary for a successful transition to a climate-resilient economy.
At this point, there are several green bond indices, including Standard & Poor’s, Bank of
America Merrill Lynch and Barclays MSCI (Ehlers and Packer, 2017). However, we are
not aware of an index that mirrors the Nordic bond mandate investing universe. When
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choosing what investment type to focus on, the authors contemplated creating two indices.
One for investment grade bonds and one for high yield bonds. However, the Nordic
market for investment grade bonds is mainly dominated by industries that are without
high risk of negative ESG events, neither physical (oil spills, pollution, the exploitation
of workers) nor transitional (new regulations, policy intervention) (Norsif, 2018). In this
universe, ESG would therefore not be much of a differentiation factor on risk or returns,
and creating an investment grade green bond index would be a time-consuming endeavour
with few decisive differences.
The Nordic high yield market, on the other hand, has a high composition of industries like
oil and gas services and shipping. These are industries where negative ESG events, both
physical and transitional, have a much higher possibility of occurring due to high levels of
carbon emissions, exposure to geopolitical disruptions, and scrutiny from policymakers.
We therefore believe that any potential influence of ESG on risk and reward has a higher
possibility of occurring in this market. If there are any differences between a green and a
conventional index, they will more likely appear here. Based on this notion, we choose to
move forward by placing our entire focus on the high yield market and create one single
index, mirroring the universe of Nordic high yield bonds. We suggest that the Nordic
investment grade market should be the target of a future thesis or research paper on green
bonds.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of
sustainable investing and green bonds. Section 3 describes various academic research
surrounding green bonds, motives for sustainable investing, and how sustainability has
affected financial performance in the past. In section 4, we explain the theoretical
frameworks most commonly used for portfolio performance analysis and the measurement
of liquidity. Section 5 describes the methodological approach used for gathering data and
constructing the index, and the empirical methodology used for performance evaluation.
Section 6 centers around the empirical results and the analysis of our index compared to
its benchmark. Section 7 provides a discussion surrounding our findings and limitations.
We give our concluding remarks in section 8.
3
2 Background
This section provides background information on topics relevant to the thesis. The first
section covers sustainable investing, including various drivers and strategies within this
topic. The second section introduces one of the most popular sustainable asset classes
and the main focus of our thesis, namely green bonds. Third, we study the unique
characteristics of the Nordic fixed income market that are important to keep in mind
when discussing what future demand for green bonds will look like in the Nordic countries.
2.1 Sustainable investing
Although successful in meeting the needs and desires of an ever-growing population, the
acceleration of human enterprise, especially since the Second World War, has led our society
to the midst of a planetary crisis: climate change. Dating back to when recordkeeping
began in 1880, the six warmest years on record have all occurred since 2015 (WMO, 2021)
and in 2019, the average global temperature reached 1.1°C above pre-industrial levels
(UNDDR, 2020). Left unchecked, the consequences of future temperature increases, which
can potentially amount to a total of 4.8°C by the end of the century (IPCC, 2014), will
be catastrophic for the environment and the economy alike. Heatwaves, cropland decline,
flooding, and water stress will affect millions of people if no significant action towards
mitigating climate change occurs (OECD, 2017). In 2019, floods, storms, and fires around
the globe fuelled by climate change resulted in more than USD 100bn worth of damages
(Kramer and Ware, 2019). If not correctly dealt with, the effects of reduced crop yields,
increased spread of diseases, and rising seas consuming coastal cities could cut the world
economy by as much as USD 23tn in 2050 (Swiss Re Institute, 2021).
Governments around the world have undertaken several actions and commitments in an
effort to fight and mitigate climate change, and many countries are aiming for a net-zero
emissions world by 2050 (United Nations, 2020). The most important initiative undertaken
by governments is arguably the Paris Climate Agreement which was adopted in 2015.
The agreement aims to contain the rise of global temperatures at below 2°C compared
to pre-industrial levels by reorienting financial flows away from fossil fuels and towards
environmentally-friendly development. It is estimated by the OECD (2017) to require a
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cumulative investment of USD 105tn in sustainable infrastructure over the next 15 years.
This staggering amount, which is higher than the current combined market capitalization
of all manageable assets globally,1 tells us two things: Firstly, it tells us that there is a
dire need for sustainable financing going forward. Secondly, that the funding necessary to
mitigate climate change is simply too large to be funded by the public sector alone. The
private sector, including pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies, needs to
at least partially finance these investments if the targets of the Paris Agreement are to be
met.
With initiatives like the Paris Agreement, the political support for addressing climate
change is gaining momentum and offering strong signals for future investment patterns.
The finance sector has seen the urge to act on the matter (EY, 2019), and as a result,
sustainable investing has become increasingly popular among investors in recent years.
Sustainable investing has many definitions and branches. In the context of this thesis,
it means for investors to consider how a company acts concerning environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) factors when assembling an investment portfolio (GSIA, 2018).2
The Environmental (E) dimension concerns a company’s impact on the ecosystems of the
earth. This dimension includes potential greenhouse gas emissions, the use of natural
resources in the production process, pollution and waste, as well as efforts undertaken to
make products or services more environmental friendly.
The Social (S) dimension concerns a company’s relationship with its most important
stakeholders besides the investors; the workforce, the customers, and society. It covers
company actions regarding gender equality and human rights, product design and services
that transform customers’ lives for the better, and its ability to be a good citizen in the
communities where it operates. The increased focus on this dimension has brought to
light scandalous working conditions and corruption incidents resulting in media outcry
and significant loss of reputation3.
The Governance (G) dimension can be divided into two. On the one hand, you have the
1The total market value of all manageable assets in the world amounts to about USD 90tn today
(Bloomberg, 2021a)
2This thesis will use the terms "sustainable investing" and "ESG investing" interchangeably.
3Take, for example, DNB’s customer Samherji and the corruption scandal in Namibia which resulted
in a reputation loss for DNB and a fine of NOK 400m (Standard & Poor’s, 2020).
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traditional corporate governance mechanisms that make management act in the long-term
shareholders’ best interest. On the other hand, in the context of sustainable investing,
the dimension means efforts to increase focus on diversity and inclusion, for instance, by
representing minorities on the board.
It is widely accepted within financial markets that companies should disclose the ESG-
related impacts deemed material to the company. On the one hand, this includes disclosing
information on how climate change, the coronavirus and policies for board diversity affect
the company’s financial position, performance and growth. On the other hand, it requires
the company to disclose how their operational activities impact the environment and their
most important stakeholders. This concept of double materiality is embedded in the EU’s
new plan for sustainable finance disclosure regulation (EU, 2019).
Various rating agencies also have firm-level measures of ESG performance, where the higher-
rated companies are more attractive for sustainability-conscious investors. Bloomberg
(2021a) estimates that assets under management based on ESG strategies amounted to
USD 37.8t in 2020 (up 66% from 2016). In Europe, sustainable investing represents 45%
of the EUR 24t assets under management (EFAMA, 2020).
2.1.1 Motivating factors and strategies
The most straightforward motivation for sustainable investing comes from social preferences
rather than financial motives (Dimson et al., 2013). An investor with social preferences
might be willing to forgo some of the potential risk-adjusted return in order to let the
fund achieve non-fiduciary goals, or alternatively, pay a premium for a fund with high
aligned ESG ratings while delivering the same ex-ante risk-return dynamics. The social
preferences reflect ethical standards and values considered important for the investor or
external organisations. Investors may also be concerned about reactions from stakeholders
unless environmental or social issues are managed. The investor may not find these issues
unethical but can worry that continuing certain practices related to these issues may anger
regulators, employees, or the general public and cause the firm to lose its social license to
operate.
Motivation for integrating ESG in portfolios can also stem from the belief that sustainability
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can enhance financial performance, as climate change represents an increasing number of
risk factors for long-term investors. As the risk of environmental disaster rises, so does
the risk of damaged infrastructure, power outages, and the loss of production facilities
in low-lying geographical locations, which all can have an adverse impact on long-term
portfolios, as mentioned in section 2.1. Also, as the evidence of man-made climate change
due to CO2 emissions keep piling on, lawmakers’ likelihood of policy intervention to limit
these emissions is on the rise. These policies may have a dire effect on the income stream
of several industries, for instance, those that are highly dependent on carbon emissions
in their production process. The possibility of the latter has increased sharply since the
signing of the Paris Climate Agreement (Carney, 2015). ESG is also believed to offer
increased downside protection in periods of market turmoil, where extra scrutiny is placed
on companies’ governance, business model and work practices (BoA Merrill Lynch, 2021).
The most obvious counterargument is that ESG-concerned fund managers and asset
owners have a binding constraint on their portfolios in that their investment options are
limited in nature and cannot fully optimize or diversify it the same way unconstrained
fund managers are. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think that these funds will most
likely underperform their competition in risk-adjusted returns. One could also argue that
the securities of "brown" companies now can be bought in the market at a discount due
to lower demand, which can generate higher returns.
The most basic and popular strategy for sustainable investing in Europe is negative
screening and the exclusion or divestment of so-called sin stocks, companies that for
instance pollute, create addiction or exploit stakeholders (GSIA, 2018). The logic behind
this strategy is that the divestment or exclusion of these companies will increase their cost
of capital and thereby make it harder for them to fund future activities, which again will
produce more negative externalities. However, as discovered by Cohen et al. (2021), there
is a paradox in that the energy sector, which is often excluded in ESG-conscious portfolios,
produces more and better green patenting and innovation than almost any other industry.
Basing an ESG approach on mere exclusion will therefore mean that clean projects will
need to overcome higher hurdle rates in order to be financed which will result in less green
innovation. Other strategies for sustainable investing includes impact investing, where
investors seek both financial returns and a positive environmental and social impact, as
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well as ESG activism, where investors actively engage with the companies they own and
try to improve their ESG practices (see e.g. Doidge et al., 2019; Cole et al., 2018). In
the next section, we will discuss one of the fastest growing investment options within the
universe of sustainable investing.
2.2 Green Bonds
Green bonds, also known as climate bonds, are a key instrument within sustainable finance
that has emerged in recent years. This section will cover some basic descriptions of green
bonds and their principles of usage, how the market has developed in the past decade,
and what the drivers and barriers of future growth are. Lastly, we will briefly present the
green bond market in the Nordic countries.
2.2.1 Definitions and principles
Green bonds are fixed-income securities that are issued to finance specific projects with
an environmentally friendly label, such as renewable energy, energy-saving buildings and
the protection of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems (Tang & Zhang, 2018). The asset
class is similar to traditional bonds in the sense that they are issued by entities to raise
capital in order to finance investments and are backed by the entire entity’s balance sheet.
The definition of green bonds is important for the purpose and the agenda of the market.
The International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) has defined green bonds as “any
type of bond instrument where the proceeds will be exclusively applied to finance or
re-finance, in part or in full, new and/or existing eligible green projects” (ICMA, 2018).
However, as it is an asset class still in its infancy, there is still not yet a widely accepted
or established definition of what a green-labeled bond is (Financial Times, 2017b). Green
bonds are issued by corporations, national and local governments as well as international
and supranational organizations.
Today, for the bond to be regarded as green, it needs to be certified by a third party,
who then decides whether the bond can be labelled as green or not. This label ensures
investors that reliable information is provided about the environmental impact of the
project financed with green debt. The most accepted market standard for being certified
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is by following the guidelines of the Green Bond Principles (GBP). These guidelines are
meant to be used as a tool to create credibility to green bonds and can be described as
“voluntary process guidelines that recommend transparency and disclosure, and promote
integrity to the development of the Green Bond Market by clarifying the approach for
issuance of a Green Bond" (IMCA, 2018). The four components of the Green Bond
Principles that any bond must follow to qualify as green are:
• Use of proceeds
• Process for project evaluation and selection
• Management of proceeds
• Reporting
After assuring that all principles are followed, the issuer must then contact an external
reviewer in order to provide a second opinion on whether the bond is aligned with
market standards and covers all four components. The most prominent reviewers include
consulting firms like Sustainalytics, CICERO, KPMG and DNV GL. To be listed on the
stock exchanges in countries like Norway and Sweden, and to be listed on the Climate
Bonds Initiative’s (CBI) green bonds list, the bond has to be certified by the external
reviewer. CBI is a not-for-profit international organization that aims to promote green
bonds as a form of capital solution for environmental-related projects. They are a
prominent player in the green bond market and have defined the Climate Bond Standard,
which is adapted by many countries and outlines the requirements for bonds wishing to
be Climate Bond Certified (Climate Bond Initiative, 2017).
2.2.2 The corporate green bond market
A growing number of corporate bonds are being issued as green-labeled bonds. Since
the issue of the first corporate green bond by Swedish property company Vasakronan in
November 2013, the market has grown rapidly, at about a 95% annual growth rate. In 2019,
the market for corporate green bonds hit a new record with gross new issuance of USD
114b, which represented 1.6% of total debt issuance world wide.4 The market faced high
4Source: Climate Bonds Initiative (2020), Dealogic (2018), authors’ calculations
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expectations as we entered 2020. But as the pandemic struck, momentum initially slowed,
with corporations and investors instead channeling social bonds earmarked for economic
support, healthcare and vaccine development (Bloomberg, 2021b). In September, however,
a radical shift in the market commenced, and issuance reached an all-time monthly high.
The drive for green bonds is expected to pick up again in 2021 as governments and
policymakers seek a sustainable economic recovery from the pandemic, with SEB analysts
expecting total green bond issuance of USD 500bn (Financial Times, 2021).
2.2.3 Trends and drivers
The rapid and exponential growth of the corporate green bond market can be linked to
several initiatives that have been undertaken in recent years in an effort to decarbonize
portfolios and promote green investments. In addition to the Paris Climate Agreement
discussed in section 2.1, where the demands for clean investments has translated into a
huge growth market for green bonds, initiatives have been sparked by investors and asset
owners themselves. With the fear of long-term wealth erosion and substantial regulations
looming on the horizon, institutional investors and their clients have appealed for more
focus on sustainable investment approaches. As a result, initiatives like the Montreal
Carbon Pledge5 and the Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition6 have been signed in recent
years. The former has 180 investors with assets under management over USD 10tn
committing to the measurement and public disclosure of their portfolios carbon footprint.
The latter consists of 32 investors with assets under management of USD 800bn pledging
to consider a company’s greenhouse gas emissions when engaging and allocating capital.
Despite the sharp rise in recent years, there is still a huge upside to the market, and green
bonds still only account for approximately 1% of the global fixed income market.
Furthermore, the opening of separate lists for labelled green bonds in stock exchanges,
such as in Oslo, London, Milano, Luxemburg, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Mexico City has
provided the market with much needed liquidity and improved both the reputation and
attractiveness of green bonds as a unique asset class among issuers and investors.
The Covid-19 pandemic could represent a historic opportunity for governments to speed
5http://montrealpledge.org
6http://unepfi.org/pdc/
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up the green shift. Stimulus packages launched around the world could bring double
benefits if they manage to both stimulate economies while simultaneously accelerating
green investments. The EU’s commitment to spending 30% of the 750 billion EUR
coronavirus recovery package on green bonds, thus placing the EU Green Deal at the core
of its recovery plan, shows a clear ambition to do just this (Dagens Næringsliv, 2020).
A major challenge for the accelerating growth of the green bonds market has been the
absence of a universal standard and definition. As the definition of being green and
sustainable differs around the world, there is a need for a commonly accepted classification
system for sustainable economic activities. The EU is currently working on such a
classification system, a taxonomy, which will be an implementation of stricter definitions
of what constitutes environmental-friendly investments. With that taxonomy also comes
the EU’s own Green Bond Standard, which can be described as a stricter version of the
Green Bond Principles discussed in section 2.2.1(see e.g. EU, 2020a,b). The taxonomy will
serve as a defence against the practice of making wrong or misleading claims about the
company’s commitment to the environment, otherwise known as greenwashing. It is set
up to protect the investor against uncertainty and misleading claims. The taxonomy will
also help guiding the future direction of the economy by setting a minimum standard that
aligns with climate and development objectives. The process has been scrutinized, with
the EU receiving almost fifty thousand comments on their draft in November 2020. Critics
of the proposal argue that the new criteria are too strict, seeing that industries that would
generally be considered sustainable are according to the taxonomy not considered "green
enough". However, there are others arguing that the criteria will not help in reaching
the target made in the Paris Agreement, as the criteria are not strict enough. The EU is
expected to implement the taxonomy by January 2022 (Ahlstrand, 2021).
2.2.4 Potential advantages
Although green bonds by definition restrict companies’ investment opportunities and
should therefore be deemed as inferior to conventional bonds, the asset class should in
theory provide both issuers and investors with several advantages. For issuers, green
bonds may demonstrate to investors, lenders and other stakeholders the organization’s
commitment and strategy towards sustainability (Flammer, 2020). Given the increasing
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demand for sustainable investment solutions, a wider investor base can be expected.
The demand can also lead to better pricing and lower market execution risk. Finally, if
investors are willing to trade financial gains for social benefits, issuers can benefit from a
lower cost of capital, which in turn will increase the firm value.
For investors, green bonds serve as an asset class that incorporates both sufficient short-
term portfolio risk and return balance, as well as lower levels of long-term climate change
risk (Climate Bond Initiative, 2017). However, green bonds might come with a premium,
which gives issuers a better price and hence a lower yield for investors. In order for the
investors to accept this lower return, they will require other benefits by holding green
bonds. One of these benefits is greater transparency in the use of proceeds as issuers are
often constrained to disclose their environmental performance. This makes investors more
confident in that their funds are supporting green projects, and allows them to measure
their environmental impact, and thereby comply with their ESG commitments.
In fixed income markets the risks of climate change are less communicated than in equity
markets. For equities, climate change risk is a tangible long-term danger as the stock of
a company is perpetual. The risk of stranded assets, physical damage and government
regulation due to climate change can have a big impact on firm valuation as we approach
2050, the deadline for many countries’ goal of carbon neutrality. Bonds, on the other
hand, with their shorter maturity, are thought to be less exposed to these risks, which
would mean that ESG should have less impact on pricing. However, the demand for green
bonds is through the roof and normally faces oversubscription at issuance (Tang and
Zhang, 2020), which indicates that there is currently a higher demand than supply. The
result of this could end up being that there is better liquidity in green bonds than in
their conventional counterpart. The fixed income market in general is plagued by low
levels of liquidity, as many of the investors of these instruments are pension funds and
insurance companies with a long-term view and a "buy-and-hold" strategy. A fixed income
instrument with high levels of liquidity could therefore be very beneficial for investors,
especially in periods where they need to sell securities for capital buffers to be upheld.
Also, as noted by DNB (Kjennerud and Heen, 2021), green bonds seem to attract a more
diverse space of investors, which would also result in improved liquidity and potentially
better price stability. If green bonds perform better in periods of market turmoil, as
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analyzed later in the thesis, there are even more diversification benefits.
Despite these cited advantages, the continuing growth of the green bond market also
faces some serious challenges and disadvantages. As mentioned earlier, there is still no
universally accepted legal definition of what a green bond actually is and as a result,
none of the Green Bond Principles mentioned in section 2.2.1 confers actionable rights
for bond investors and are often not included as direct covenants. Indeed, if the issuers
fail to comply with the stated principles, by for instance not using the proceeds for
environmentally-friendly projects or through inadequate reporting, the holders of the
bonds would not be eligible for early redemption in the event of breach. In other words,
there is no guarantee that a green bond remains green throughout its life, and the investors
are the ones who bear this risk. Also as mentioned earlier, the investors of green bonds are
subject to greenwashing, a concept where the bond issuance is nothing but a marketing
gimmick with no real impact on the issuers environmental impact. As the market criteria
is based on voluntary compliance only, one can not say for certain that some green bonds
actually follow the guidance of the GBP, which again contributes to growing scepticism
surrounding the legitimacy of the market. Finally, despite increased buy-side demand and
a more expensive and complex issuance process compared to conventional bonds,7 there is
still no clear evidence of pricing benefits for issuers in the form of reduced cost of debt.
2.3 The Nordic fixed income market
The Nordic economies are widely considered to be among the most politically stable in the
world and have firm macroeconomic fundamentals with low unemployment, high levels of
education, small socioeconomic differences, and a high GDP per capital (Anndersen et al.,
2007). Corporations are in general well governed, which contributes to good opportunities
for long-term growth. Because the Nordic governments have strict supervision of
the financial markets they are considered to be transparent and safe for investment
opportunities.
According to Nordic Trustee (2020), the outstanding volume in the Nordic corporate bond
7Getting an external review or second opinion on whether the bond follows the guidelines of the GBP
costs between USD 12 000 and 40 000 and the underwriting process in itself is also more expensive for
green bonds. Also, the issuers are required to report on the greenness of the bonds on a semi-annual basis.
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market contains 56% investment-grade and 44% high yield bonds, and sum up to a total of
EUR 106bn. The Norwegian and Swedish markets are by far the largest with respectively
50% and 40% of the total outstanding volume by year-end of 2020. In Denmark, most
issuers of investment grade bonds have issued their bonds with EU legislation8 which is
partly why they only represent about 2% of the total Nordic bond market, as seen in
figures 2.1a and 2.1b below. (Nordic Trustee, 2020)
(a) The Nordic investment grade market. (b) The Nordic high yield market.
Figure 2.1: The Nordic Bond Market 2020, EURbn (Underlying data: Nordic Trustee).
High yield
The high yield corporate bond market has shifted remarkably towards non-oil related
industries the past decade. This is shown in figure 2.2 which provides an overview of the
industry distribution in 2008 and 2019. We see a clear shift from oil-related industries to
a more varied spectrum of real estate, industry and finance. This shift from the oil and
gas sector has made the Nordic high yield market less sensitive to oil price fluctuations.
There is a substantial share of non-Nordic issuers in the Norwegian high yield market,
accounting for 40% of volumes. In the Swedish market on the other hand, only 10% of
new issued volumes in 2020 were issued by non-Nordic companies (Nordic Trustee, 2020).
The non-Nordic issuers in the Norwegian high yield corporate bond market are primarily
from shipping, oil service and telecommunication sectors, as the Oslo Exchange has a
strong position in these industries. However, the share of oil-related non-Nordic issuance
has had a considerable decrease in the later years.
8Every bond has a 12-character identification code (International Securities Identification Number,
ISIN). The two first letters of the code show the bonds legislation. Norwegian bonds start with NO,
Danish bonds DK, Swedish bonds with SE, etc. A majority of the Danish bonds are issued with EU
legislation and hence an ISIN code that starts with XS (ISIN Organization, 2021).
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Figure 2.2: Industry distribution in Nordic high yield, 2008 vs 2019 (FIRST Fondene
AS, 2021).
Investing in the Nordic high yield credit market gives investors downside protection, as
the credit premiums are higher than outside the region. This is partly due to the sector
composition and also the fact that the market share of smaller issuers is higher, which
is generally compensated for by giving the investors a higher credit premium. The high
yield market also offers the opportunity to diversify beyond the equity market. The sector
composition in the Nordic high yield market is shown in appendix A1.
2.3.1 The Nordic green bond market
Being a civil law region with high focus on balancing the rights of different stakeholders
instead of solely focusing on maximizing shareholder value, the Nordics have the highest
ESG-scores in the world (Liang and Renneboog, 2016). As a result, the Nordic green
bond market has grown tremendously during the last decade and has put the Nordic
countries on the map by its many "firsts". It was Norwegian research institute CICERO
who provided the second opinion when the inaugural green bond was issued by the World
Bank in 2007. Swedish Vasakronan’s green bond in 2013 was the world’s first corporate
green bond issuance, and the Swedish City of Gothenburg was the first city to do so
the same year. Odfjell SE was the first company in the shipping industry to issue a
sustainability-linked bond9 which marked a milestone for a "brown" industry heading
9A sustainability-linked bond is a forward-looking instrument where issuers are committing explicitly
to future improvements in sustainability outcomes. It differs from green bonds in the sense that the
proceeds are not ring-fenced to be applied towards green or sustainable purposes. (ICMA, 2020)
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towards greener technology. Oslo Stock Exchange (now Euronext) increased the visibility
of green investment choices when they became the first stock exchanges in the world to
implement a separate list for labelled green bonds in 2015 (Nordnet, 2020).
The total outstanding volume in the Nordic corporate green bond market has grown
about 30-60% annually since 2016 and reached EUR 14bn by the end of 2020. While still
trailing Nordic issuance leader Sweden, the Norwegian market stands out with the highest
growth rate among the Nordic countries last year, mainly led by increased issuance from
the financial and utility sector. Sweden is the largest issuer of the Nordic green bonds
and holds approximately 66% of the volume, but the recent years tripling issue volume in
Norway has been a sign of increased Norwegian demand by investors. The green bond
market in Denmark and Finland has yet to see the same growth as in Norway and Sweden,
and the countries contribute 2% and 3.5% to the Nordic green bond market, respectively
(Nordic Trustee, 2020).
According to DNB analysts Kjennerud and Heen (2021) 14% of the total high yield bond
volume issued in the Nordics in 2020 were labeled as green. So far this year, the share
has increased to 21%. The sector composition in the Nordic green high yield market is
visualised in figure 2.3:
Figure 2.3: Nordic high yield: amount outstanding of green bonds, NOKbn. Underlying
data: Stamdata, further calculations: DNB Markets (Kjennerud and Heen, 2021).
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Figure 2.4 shows the growth of the Nordic green bond market as a percentage of the
overall Nordic corporate bond market for the past five years. We can see that green bonds
are representing a larger and larger share of the bond market.
Figure 2.4: The growth of the Nordic green bond market compared to the overall Nordic
corporate bond market. Underlying data: Nordic Trustee.
In November 2017, Norway’s Government Pension Fund announced that they would intent
to divest fossil fuel investments, and since 2015 they have published annual reports on
their responsible investments (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2020). This change
in investor behavior from such a large-scale fund has brought other asset managers to
re-assess their portfolios and align to climate improvement. The Swedish pension fund AP7
also made an active statement when selling its investments in six energy companies which
were said to violate the Paris Agreement (AP7, 2017). We clearly see a trend that the
pension funds from the region, such as Norway’s biggest pension company KLP (2021) and
Denmark’s largest pension and processing company ATP (2020), integrate sustainability
in their investment strategies and lead the way in the transition to a low-carbon economy.
In the next section, we will outline the literature review for this master thesis.
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3 Literature review
This section will provide an overview of the existing literature on green bonds, investor
motivations for sustainable investing and how ESG has affected the performance of
investment portfolios.
3.1 Green bonds
An emerging research literature on green bonds is trying to understand their necessity;
whether the green label is merely a marketing gimmick and how the risk and return
characteristics of green bonds differ from their “brown” counterparts. Within the topic of
greenwashing, Flammer (2020) did a study on the environmental performance of companies
post the issuance of green bonds and found a significant improvement in ESG rating and
a decrease in CO2 emissions. These findings are inconsistent with the marketing gimmick
argument.
Inderst et al. (2012) were among the first to study the benefits of green bonds to investors.
Based on low correlation with other fixed income securities, they argued that green bonds
provided good diversification benefits and should therefore be viewed as an attractive
investment. Other studies look at the yields of the asset class compared to their brown
counterparts, with several studies reaching the conclusion of either no yield premium for
green bonds (Tang and Zhang, 2020; Climate Bond Initiative, 2017; Larcker and Watts,
2019) or a negative yield premium between 18 and 26 basis points (Ehlers and Packer,
2017; Barclays, 2015; Baker et al., 2018). However, these premiums are measured in the
primary market and will not necessarily translate into a significant underperformance
in the secondary market, where the primary focus of this thesis is. As explained by
Ehlers and Packer, the secondary market investors may price in a different premium than
investors in the primary market, and the latter will have decided ex-ante whether it is
more beneficial to hold the bond to maturity or to cash in the premium.
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3.2 Investors
Prospect Theory, first developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), tells us that investors
are to a higher degree negatively impacted by losses than they are positively impacted
by gains of the same magnitude. They should, in other words, be willing to trade off
some returns in periods of non-crisis for the downside protection ESG firms seem to offer
in periods of crisis. However, the academic research surrounding the topic of investors
willingness to trade wealth merely for societal benefits, is mixed. Two securities with the
same risk and return characteristic, according to no-arbitrage theory, should be priced
identically regardless of ESG-rating. However, a growing amount of academic research
suggests that investors are willing to pay a premium for securities that contribute to
societal or environmental improvement. Maltais and Nykvist (2020) surveyed investors
in Sweden and found that social preferences and business-case incentives, rather than
financial incentives are the most important motivational driver for holding green bonds.
The investors holding these bonds expressed their willingness to accept the potential of
weaker returns to invest according to their own ethical standards. Similarly, Martin and
Moser (2016) did a study on how investors respond to news on CSR and found evidence
that investors reacted positively to reports of green investments by companies, even when
the investments had no implications on future cash flows. The conclusion was in the end
that both investors and managers trade off wealth for societal benefits. These findings
suggest that investors value sustainability in companies and are willing to give up financial
returns in order to invest according to their own social preferences. In such case, an index
consisting of green bonds would not necessarily have to provide competitive returns in
order to be seen as attractive for investors.
It is, however, questionable whether these results and conclusions are transferable to
real market settings. Larcker and Watts (2019) and their research on the United States
municipal green bond market concluded that investors in real market settings, when risk
and return are known ex-ante, appear unwilling to pay extra to invest in environmentally
sustainable projects unless the projects provided favorable financial benefits. The greenium,
known as the potential extra cost investors are willing to pay to acquire green securities,
was essentially zero. They also concluded that although these results wouldn’t necessarily
be transferable to the corporate bond market, the willingness for investors to pay a
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potential greenium would most likely be revealed in the municipal bond market.10
The results provided by Larcker and Watts seem to be in line with what Nordic fixed
income investors consider their motivation for integrating ESG in their portfolios. A
survey of Norwegian institutional fixed income investors undertaken by Norsif (2018)
concluded that these investors’ primary motivation for ESG integration is to decrease
downside risk and increasing risk-adjusted performance. Similarly, Biel and Jansson (2011)
surveyed Swedish institutional investors who were mostly motivated by the possibility of
reducing financial risk. In other words, to appeal to our targeted investor segment, our
Green Bond Index would most likely have to provide return and risk characteristics that
are competitive with what the overall market is offering.
3.3 Sustainability and performance
This section will focus on the published literature regarding the performance of socially
responsible portfolios, both stocks and bonds. The impact of ESG on mutual fund
performance is mixed at best, and there is still no consensus about whether ESG-based
investing helps or hurts performance (Gerard, 2018). There are reasons to believe that ESG
considerations actually hurt performance and expected returns. Hong and Kacperczyk
(2009) show that investing in companies with high ESG performance yields a lower return
than investing in companies deemed socially irresponsible, with the reason being that
socially irresponsible companies are deemed as riskier by investors, who in turn require
a higher return as compensation. Bolton and Kacperczyk (2020a,b) take this notion
a step further and present a global sample of companies with high carbon emissions.
They find that companies with higher carbon emissions in the US, Europe, and Asia
are rewarded with higher stock returns and confirm the existence of a carbon premium.
This carbon premium is, among others, the result of investors divesting and negatively
screening companies deemed not to be environmentally friendly. As debt markets are
less transparent than equity markets11, it’s hard to say whether this carbon premium
10Due to the fact that the issuance size of municipal bonds is smaller than for corporate bonds,
investors with utility for green investments in the municipal bond market have a higher chance of being
the ones who set the price of the bonds. In the much larger corporate bond market, these investors will
to a less degree have the capacity to affect bond prices.
11Mutual funds and institutions are required to disclose their equity positions on a semiannual basis.
However, no such requirement is needed for bond positions.
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is transferable to bonds. Views from the other side of the spectrum state that "there
is a mounting evidence that funds which observe environmental, social and governance
(ESG) standards in their strategies tend to outperform those that don’t by a significant
margin" (Financial Times, 2017a). Nofsinger and Varma (2014) look at the performance
of socially responsible funds during market crises and find a significant outperformance
compared to conventional mutual funds during periods of turmoil in the market. This
outperformance does, however, come at the cost of underperforming during non-crisis
periods. Looking specifically at the performance of socially responsible bond funds from
2001 to 2014, Henke (2016) documents that these funds outperform their conventional
counterparts by about 25 basis points a year in the US and about 50 basis points in the
Eurozone. Again, the outperformance stems from abnormal returns in periods of marekt
turmoil. With the worldwide impact of the Covid-19 crisis on financial markets fresh in
mind, these findings are particularly interesting.
On a firm level, different aspects of social responsibility have been examined in recent
years. A meta-study conducted by Friede et al. (2015) concluded that 90% of academic
research finds a nonnegative relationship between social responsibility and financial
performance. Similarly, Eccles et al. (2014) has presented evidence for a positive
relationship between sustainability and profitability, where high sustainability firms
outperform low sustainability firms, both on stock market performance and accounting
based performance. ESG engagement on a firm level also leads to more motivated
employees, which again results in positive abnormal financial returns (Edmans, 2012;
Jørgensen and Pedersen, 2018). Concerning ESG and the downside risk of firms, Hong
et al. (2019) concluded that firms with good ESG-scores receive significantly more lenient
sanctions and settlements from lawmakers than firms with low ESG-scores, and that firms
with good ESG scores outperform their low ESG counterpart by an average of 2.4% in
the stock market in the six months following the date the sanctions are made public.
It is important to note that although these studies mostly look at equity values, they are
still relevant for bondholders, as changes in firm value will affect the firm’s creditworthiness
(Gerard, 2018).
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3.3.1 Comparing indices performance
There exists a limited body of literature on the performance of sustainable and socially
responsible indices, and most of these focus on the equity markets.
Statman (2000) was the first to make a comparison between a socially responsible and a
conventional stock index when he compared the Domini Social Index (Now the MSCI KLD
400) to the S&P 500. His findings were that although the Domini performed better than
the S&P 500, none of the differences in risk-adjusted returns were statistically significant.
A few years later, he broadened his study to include more stock indices: the Domini Social
Index, the Citizens Index, the Calvert Social Index, and the US portion of the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index (Statman, 2006). He found that, in general, the socially responsible
indices performed better than the S&P 500 while having higher ESG-scores at the same
time. Despite high correlations between the socially responsible funds and the S&P 500,
tracking errors were substantial.
Ehlers and Packer (2017) contribute to the literature by comparing four green bond indices
to the overall market over a 36 month period between July 2014 and June 2017, making it
one of the first studies on sustainable bond indices. After analysing and comparing their
hedged returns12 and volatility, the authors found that some of the green bond indices
showed slightly better risk-adjusted returns than their conventional peers, although the
results were not statistically significant. This outperformance was mostly driven by lower
levels of volatility than the rest of the market.
Similarly, Medda and Partridge (2018) look at the financial performance of US municipal
green bond indices between October 2014 and October 2017 compared to the overall
municipal bond market, with sub-indices for different sectors and states. Interestingly,
all indices outperformed their conventional counterparts in terms of both Sharpe Ratio,
Information Ratio and alpha. Also, in this study, the outperformance was mostly driven
by markedly lower levels of volatility.
Our study will contribute to the literature by looking at the Nordic high yield green bond
12The returns in US dollars that can be achieved by hedging the currency exposures of the underlying
index. This limits the effect of currency movements and makes the results more comparable across indices
that differ in currency composition and exposure. Hedging was done by selling foreign currency forwards
at one-month forward rates. This is further explained in section 5.3.3.
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market specifically, and analyzing the performance of this asset class over time by creating
a green bond index. Further, it will analyze whether the asset class is better equipped
at hedging downside risk in periods of market turmoil. As far as our understanding
goes, neither has been done in the Nordic marketplace before. The study will therefore
contribute valuable insights for investors looking to invest in green bonds in the Nordics.
23
4 Theory
4.1 Risk and performance analysis
4.1.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model
The econometric modelling of abnormal returns in this thesis is based on the Capital Asset
Pricing Model. This model, called CAPM for short, was developed in various articles by
Treynor (1961, 1962), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965b,a), and Mossin (1966) and is based
on Markowitz’s (1952) model on diversification and modern portfolio theory. Markowitz
assumes that investors are rational, risk-averse, and views the investment outcome as a
probability distribution. The two parameters that form the basis of an investor’s portfolio
choice are the expected future wealth and risk, measured in standard deviation. The
utility function is as follows:
U = f(Ew,  w) (4.1)
where Ew stands for expected future wealth and  w is the estimated standard deviation
of the likely discrepancy between what the expected future wealth is and what the actual
future wealth is (Sharpe, 1964). The combination of a risky tangency portfolio and a
risk-free asset will therefore be the basis for all mean-variance efficient portfolios (Fama
and French, 2004).
The equation of the CAPM is as follows:
E(Ri) = Rf +  iM [E(RM) Rf ] (4.2)
where E(Ri) is the expected return of the portfolio, Rf is the risk-free rate, and E(RM ) Rf
is the excess return of the market portfolio.  iM measures the correlation of the portfolio
return with the excess market portfolio return, and Rf is the return of a risk-free asset
with no correlation with the market, otherwise known as a "zero-beta asset" (Fama and
French, 2004). Although the CAPM theoretically should be able to price all assets, it
should be noted that it is most commonly applied to equity. Extra care should therefore
be taken when evaluating risk using the CAPM for fixed-income investments.
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4.1.2 Performance Indicators
Risk and performance measurement is an active area for academic research and is essential
to investors who want to make informed decisions. Brown and Reilly (2012) presents some
of the most famous and widely used measures for assessing the performance of a portfolio
– the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966), the information ratio (Grinold, 1989), and Jensen’s
Alpha (Jensen, 1968). These performance measures aim to standardise performance
results by accounting for the risk taken to achieve portfolio returns. Normally when using
risk-adjusted performance measures to compare portfolios, the differences in investment
mandates should be kept in mind. However, there is little need for such consideration
when analyzing and comparing indices from the same region. The portfolio’s benchmark






The Sharpe ratio is a widely used measure of risk-adjusted performance. It is computed
by dividing the portfolios’ return in excess of the risk-free rate by its standard deviation.
A higher Sharpe ratio indicates that the portfolio is able to generate a higher expected
return per unit of risk. The Sharpe ratio allows us to directly compare the risk-adjusted






The information ratio is calculated by dividing the mean of the portfolio’s return relative
to the benchmark’s return, otherwise known as the alpha, by the standard deviation of
the portfolio’s active return, known as the tracking error. The information ratio measures
both risk and return in terms of deviations from the reference index. The information
ratio is similar to the Sharpe ratio in that they both measure performance per unit of
risk, and they are identical when the risk-free rate is used as a benchmark. However,
the information ratio can also provide an indication of whether the portfolio is able to
outperform its benchmark on a consistent basis.
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Jensen’s alpha
↵i = Ri  Rf    i(RM  Rf ) (4.5)
One of the central assumptions of the CAPM is that all differences in expected return are
explained by the portfolio’s exposure to the overall market, otherwise known as beta. Beta
measures systematic risk and is estimated by regressing the portfolio returns in excess
of the risk-free rate on the benchmark’s excess return. The alpha is the average return
that is left after correcting for the portfolio’s beta and can be interpreted as the part of
the portfolio returns that can be accredited to the portfolio manager’s ability to generate
risk-adjusted excess returns. While conventional fund alpha measures the value of active
management, the potential alpha for our index will reflect the influence of social screens
and future environmental and policy risk on average portfolio risk and return. Unlike the
Sharpe ratio or the information ratio that both assume all risk to be relevant, Jensen’s
alpha assumes that only the risk that cannot be diversified away is important.
4.2 Liquidity
As mentioned in section 2.2.4, green bonds may have the advantage of being a more liquid
asset than their conventional or "brown" equivalents in periods where the markets are
more volatile. Liquidity measures can therefore be used to detect the risk premium and
monitor different aspects of market liquidity.
Foucault et al. (2013) defines liquidity as "the degree to which an order can be executed
within a short time frame at a price close to the security’s consensus value". If markets
are illiquid it means that the investors face higher trading costs because securities are
costlier to buy, and sell for less compared to a liquid security. When the market is illiquid,
a larger bond purchase or sale will move the market price. The less liquid the market is,
the larger the price movements, and hence the more volatile the market.
According to Foucault et al. (2013), there are three types of liquidity. The first is
market liquidity, which is the ability to trade a security quickly at a price close to its
fundamental value. Second, we have funding liquidity which is the ability to obtain credit
at acceptable terms and to meet financial obligations.Funding and market liquidity are
mutually reinforcing in good times, and mutually hurting in times of crisis because if
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market liquidity dries up it increases the risk of financing trade and margins get higher.
Lastly, we have monetary liquidity which is the money supply provided by the central
bank. This affects funding liquidity by enhancing banks’ ability to lend out money and
increase credit. By affecting funding liquidity, monetary liquidity also affects market
liquidity, especially during a crisis where monetary expansion is associated with greater
liquidity in the bond and stock markets.
In limit order markets, where buy and sell orders are matched in a single marketplace,
traders can submit limit orders or market orders. Limit orders are liquidity providers as
they form the limit order book, and market orders are liquidity demanders as they are
matched against already submitted limit orders. In dealer markets, however, the trade
typically happens over-the-counter (OTC) with a dealer that posts quotes to investors.
After a trade between an investor and a dealer happens, the dealer goes to the "interdealer
market" and trades the security with other dealers in order to get rid of his position.
In the OTC markets, the dealers provide liquidity to the investors when posting prices.
Corporate bonds are often traded in OTC markets.
4.2.1 Measuring liquidity in bond markets
There are several measures of market liquidity in OTC markets such as the corporate bond
market. They can be categorized as price impact measures, volume-based measures and
transaction cost measures. The Amihud ratio is the most used price impact measure and
measures how much traded volume is needed to change the price one percent (Foucault
et al., 2013). Volume-based measures use order and trade size to see whether or not the
market can absorb large volumes within a short time period. As we do not have volume
data and only limited transaction data for the green bonds, we will not go into detail on
these measures.
The quoted bid-ask spread is one of the most widely used liquidity measures in the bond
(and stock) market and equals the difference between the highest quoted bid price (b) and
the lowest quoted ask price (a). The spread is defined as:
S ⌘ a  b (4.6)
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The mid price is defined as:
m ⌘ a+ b
2
(4.7)









Designing, constructing, and maintaining indices for corporate bonds is a far bigger
challenge than creating indices for equities. While a company mostly has only one listed
stock on an exchange, the same company can have several bonds outstanding, all with
different sizes, maturities, currencies, and yields (Campani and Goltz, 2011). As a result
of this, extra caution concerning index objective, criteria, and construction methodology
is taken. The first part of this section will therefore provide concrete guidelines and
motivations for all decisions undertaken in order to complete our Nordic High Yield Green
Bond Index. The second part will provide the methodology for calculating values used in
the analysis in chapter 6.
5.1 Index objective
The Nordic High Yield Green Bond Index is composed of a universe of Nordic Bonds
aligned with the Green Bond Principles and subject to the eligibility criteria. It is a
market value-weighted index designed to replicate and track the performance of green
corporate high yield bonds in the Nordic market.
The purpose of this index is to serve investors with a Nordic investment mandate, that
are interested in the Nordic green bond market. It is important that the index is a valid
representation of the asset class and that it mirrors the market in which ordinary investors
actually invest. This makes the methodology an important factor when constructing the
index. The eligibility criteria in section 5.2 are based upon best practice combined with
our subjective assessment in order to make the index consistent with international practice
and the investors’ investment mandate. We do not aim to include bonds that are on the
periphery of what is considered the Nordic market.
We want our index to be a realistic basis for investment purposes. However, it is also
important that it can act as an indicator of the market price of green bonds. Hence,
the index must enable the investor to observe the overall performance of the green bond
market in aggregate and how this market has evolved over the past years.
Constructing a bond index can seem somewhat more complicated than constructing a
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stock index, as these types of securities have very different characteristics. The bond
market is larger and changes more frequently as new bonds are issued and existing bonds
mature or get called. There can be multiple bonds issued by the same entity which hold
different risks. Also, stocks are typically traded in limit order markets where liquidity is
high, while bonds are traded OTC with a dealer who posts quotes. This impacts pricing
because continuous transaction data are not available for bonds. We get further into this
matter in section 5.3.1.
5.2 Eligibility Criteria
The Eligibility criteria are mainly based upon recommended principles such as the S&P
Construction Methodology for fixed income securities (2021a) and Bloomberg Barclays
Index Methodology (2016). The Nordic bond market differs from the global bond market,
which demands some deviation from international bond index practice. This can be seen
especially when considering market size and the coupon type, as Nordic bonds are typically
smaller and more often have floating interest rates. We therefore also include DNB’s
practice of index construction in our assessment. A summary of our and the benchmarks’
criteria can be found in table 5.1 at the end of this subsection.
It is important that the index is representative of the market targeted in this thesis, and
reflects the available investment opportunities. Furthermore, it is also essential that the
index is transparent and rule-based so that it is possible to replicate and allows users to
understand the composition of the index.
Classification
For a bond to be rated as high yield, it must have a rating of at best BB+ (Fitch and S&P)
or Ba1 (Moody’s). See appendix A2 for rating overview. If the issuer receives a credit
rating from one of the rating agencies as investment grade, the issuer’s bond(s) are not
eligible for the index. Bonds of issuers in default are also not eligible. Nordic corporate
high yield bonds are typically issued without public rating as this is not a requirement in
the Nordic market. 52% of the Swedish issued bonds hold a credit rating, whilst in the
Norwegian market, the credit-rated volume is barely 27% (Nordic Trustee, 2020). Credit
research managers, therefore, compute frequent shadow ratings on new issues based on
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international rating agency methods.
Nordic Trustee is the leading provider of bond services in the Nordics (Nordic Trustee,
2021). When we collect the list of green bonds, we use their market and data service
provider Stamdata’s database. Even though Nordic bonds aren’t required to have a credit
quality classification, Stamdata distinguishes between investment grade and high yield.
We use their classifications to find the bonds in the high yield segment. Since these two
types of bonds have very different characteristics and therefore are priced differently, we
only make the high yield bonds eligible for inclusion. There are other types of investors
in the investment grade market (e.g., banks, insurance companies, and pension funds),
which can give this segment better liquidity.
Another aspect that is important to consider when choosing which bonds to include is
that there are some investment grade bonds that are mostly traded by high yield investors.
Since our purpose is to create an index that matches the investors’ actual investment
base, these types of bonds should be included in the index. However, since we don’t hold
information about the buyers, we cannot take this into account. We will therefore use
Stamdata’s high yield and investment grade rating as our basis for classification.
Green Label
ESG rating is perhaps the key criteria when creating a Green Bond Index. There exist
bonds that do not hold the label "green" but would be considered to be green based on
the firm’s environmental focus. Labelled green bonds only account for some of all bonds
that are related to climate-friendly activities. One of the most crucial decisions in this
thesis has therefore been whether or not to include unlabelled green bonds in our data set.
We believe that investors, to assure credibility, look for bonds that are labelled as green by
an external reviewer13 when choosing a climate-friendly investment. The external reviews
and green label reduces the information asymmetry on greenness which is one of the most
challenging aspects of this market segment. Standards, such as the EU Taxonomy and
the including EU Green Bond Standard, will help define the green investments. Hovewer,
since this taxonomy will not be official in the near future, the green label is currently the
13Such as DNV GL, CICERO, etc.
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best verification that the investments are fostering climate-friendly activities. The green
label is also what qualifies the bonds to Oslo Stock Exchange’s list of green bonds and
Nasdaq’s list of sustainable debt.
Another feature regarding the green label is the question of whether to include all ESG-
labelled bonds or only the ones that are labelled as green. Social and sustainability
bonds are included in the broad sustainability category, but as our impression is that the
green bonds are more applicable to the investors, we have chosen to exclude social and
sustainability bonds. Sustainability-linked bonds, like the bonds issued by Odfjell SE and
Seaspan Corp, are also excluded because the sustainability-linked category also supports
investments that are not directly linked to climate-friendly projects.
Legislation
The first two letters of the bond’s ISIN code indicate from which country the legislation
originates. The Nordic bond markets differ from the US and EU markets as they demands
far less documentation, which makes transaction costs substantially lower. We have
therefore chosen to exclude Nordic bonds issued with American or European legislation,
as the issuers of these bonds pay a higher cost to attract other international investors.
We have, on the other hand, included non-Nordic companies that hold Nordic legislation
(Nordic ISIN codes).
Amount outstanding
In order to keep the index representative, we require the amount outstanding to be a
minimum of NOK 300m. This is a subjective assessment based on interest from ordinary
bond investors and fund managers. Smaller bonds have a smaller investor universe, which
also lowers the liquidity. Nordic Bond Pricing also states this as a criterion for their
Regular Market bond index and Norwegian High Yield Market bond index (Annweiler,
2017). If a bond is partly repaid and the outstanding amount falls below NOK 300m,
the bond will be taken out of the index at month-end when the index is rebalanced (see
section 5.3.2).
Most institutional American and European investors have size requirements of 200 million
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EUR or USD for their high yield indices and 750 million EUR or USD for investment
grade. If a bond has a smaller notional, it is not considered an investment opportunity.
MSCI, therefore, operates with roughly the same criteria for their indices (MSCI, 2020).
Maturity
Eligibility criteria differ among various indices with regards to their time to maturity.
Our index includes bonds with maturity greater or equal to 1 year when measured from
the rebalancing date. This is consistent with the MSCI corporate bond methodology
(MSCI, 2020) and the previously mentioned Barclays’ methodology (2016). MSCI also
adds the feature that the new additions must have a maturity greater or equal to 18
months. Since we require at least one year to maturity, all short-term bonds that are
issued with maturity < 1 year are excluded.
For the majority of the S&P fixed income indices, the minimum term to maturity is at
least one calendar month as of the next rebalancing date. Nordic Bond Pricing (Annweiler,
2017) uses one month as their criteria in their Regular Market bond index and Norwegian
High Yield Market bond index.
This one month criterion is important because of how the bonds are priced in the
secondary market. Bonds with maturity < 1 year might have pricing that differs from the
representative market development. If the bonds were to be included, we could get an
abnormal effect when calculating duration, yield, and spreads.
We only face this problem once in the Green Bond Index, with the Scatec bond which
terminates in November 2021. This bond is excluded when rebalancing the weights at the
end of November 2020.
Coupon type
The Nordic bond market differs from the international market when it comes to having
fixed or floating rate. The large amount of floating-rate bonds in the Nordic are present
because the general interest rates on loans and mortgages are mostly floating. These
bonds are bound to a reference rate, for example, Nibor or Stibor, which makes the bonds
less sensitive to interest rate changes.
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Most international corporate bond indices exclude floating rate bonds in their data sets.
The MSCI Corporate Bond Indices and Bank of America Merrill Lynch Green Bond Index
are among them. S&P chooses to not include floating-rate securities in most of their fixed
income indices but includes floaters in their Green Bond Index (S&P Dow Jones Indices,
2021b). Nordic Bond Pricing’s Regular Market Bond Index and Norwegian High Yield
Market Bond Index both include floating rate bonds (Annweiler, 2017).
Since approximately 93% of the Nordic green bonds in our database have floating rates,
an exclusion of these would make the index pointless. The only bonds with fixed interest
rates are two issued by the same issuer, RE IV LTD (White Peak Real Estate), a Swedish
real estate company with operations in China and, one by Kungsleden AB.
Currencies
In our selection of eligible securities, there are bonds listed in the currencies NOK, SEK,
EUR and USD. Our index uses NOK as base currency, but we include all currencies in the
index. We use forward and spot rates to hedge the return against currency fluctuations.
Currency hedging is explained in detail in section 5.3.3.
Other excluded bonds
All perpetual bonds are excluded for technical reasons. Most perpetual bonds do have
some sort of call feature which allows the issuer to redeem the bond at a fixed date.
However, the reason for exclusion is the technical difficulties when calculating the duration
of the bond.
Sinkable bonds are bonds that are backed by funds that are set aside in order to ensure
principal and interest payments. They are often accompanied by call schedules which
mean that the outstanding amount can be repaid by the issuer entirely or in part. Because
of the uncertainty concerning when the bonds will be repaid, sinkable bonds are not
included.
Private placements will not be traded in the market. These are bonds that are sold to
a small number of investors, and will therefore be misleading if they are included since
the index is supposed to be a representation of tradable bonds.
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Eligibility criteria summarised
The following table is based on the index methodology of Nordic Bond Pricing (2020),
DNB (O. A. Kjennerud, personal communication, February 2021)14, Barclays (2016), and
S&P Dow Jones Indices (2021a). As the two latter have a broad list of indices with
different criteria, we have selected the most common for all their indices and/or the most
comparable to our index.
14DNB has not publicly published their index methodology
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5.3 Implementation and calculations
5.3.1 Data and price sources
It is important that prices are consistent and reliable throughout the bond period, which
can be an issue in an illiquid market. There are several ways of dealing with this issue, and
the ones proposed in Campani and Goltz’s report (2011) are transaction prices, matrix
prices, or dealer prices.
Since the Nordic high yield market is highly illiquid, bonds are not traded on a daily
basis. This makes continuous observable transaction prices unavailable, and in addition,
transaction prices in this market are usually opaque. Matrix pricing is an approach
where one calculates parameters using comparable bonds with similar features (sector,
rating, time-to-maturity, etc.) and thereby estimates the prices. This approach lacks the
idiosyncratic risk components, and illiquidity would be challenging to cover. The last
alternative pricing source is, therefore, dealer pricing. Dealers are continuously providing
bid and ask prices for all kinds of bonds in the OTC market. Therefore, using dealer
prices solves the consistency problem. According to Campani and Goltz (2011), most
corporate bond indices are based on dealer prices.
Finding a reliable pricing source is important. DNB is one of the largest facilitators for
corporate green bonds in the Nordic high yield market, and they wish to set competitive
prices on as many bonds as possible. In order to keep our pricing source consistent, we
have chosen to use DNB as the only pricing source, and we use the bid prices as a basis
for our index. A bid price is a price where the dealer is willing to buy the bond and is,
therefore, a realistic price at which the investor can sell it once it is in the portfolio. Since
our price source comes from only one provider, this might be a limitation of data which
will be discussed in section 7.1.
In order to provide a complete overview of all Nordic green bonds, we have used Stamdata’s
bond database. We filtered the data set according to our eligibility criteria in 5.2. Finally,
we collected the relevant information on each bond with help from Ole André Kjennerud
in DNB and excluded the perpetual bonds and private placements. Now that we had
the complete set of bonds that were going to be included in the index, we obtained and
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calculated the necessary data for each trading day and saved it in a database.
Settlement assumptions
Bonds are assumed to settle on the next calendar day (T+1). On the last trading date
of each month, the settlement date will be the first calendar day of the following month.
This assures that the accrued interest of the last trading day of the month is included
when calculating one full month of accrued interest.
Time specification
The bonds are priced only on Oslo Stock Exchange business days at 16:00 Oslo time
(GMT+1). When Oslo Stock Exchange closes earlier, we use the last prices available for
that day. The currency fixing will be taken at the same time as the bond prices.
The index starts on the first trading day of January 2019 and ends on the last trading
day of April 2021. The start date could have been set earlier, but since the number of
bonds eligible before 2019 is so few, the index would consist of too much idiosyncratic
risk, and it would not be representative of the market.
5.3.2 Weights
MSCI (2020) and a majority of S&P Dow Jones fixed income indices (2021a) weights its
corporate bond indices by market value. We use the same approach in the Green Bond
Index, where the market value accounts for both market price and accrued interest. The
weight of each bond is, therefore, the individual market value divided by the market value






i=1 Pi ⇥ Vi
(5.1)
Where: Wi = the weight of bond i in the index, and MVi = is the market value of bond i.
Pi is the dirty price at the end of the month, and Vi is the outstanding amount of bond i.
Other indices might weigh each bond by the same factor, while others might use weight
caps or other restrictions. An important benefit when using market value weights is that
an investor would not have to rebalance her portfolio on a daily basis in order to keep the
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composition equal to the reference index. The reason for this lack of need to rebalance
the portfolio is because its weights will change automatically. She would only have to
rebalance when there are new bonds issued or called. On the other side, a value-weighted
index can be vulnerable because it might be that the most highly indebted companies
get the largest weights. Companies that are highly indebted might not be able to finance
the interest payments, which can make these companies riskier. This is called "the bums
problem" (James West, 2017) and is sometimes overlooked by index providers. However,
some providers avoid this problem by using capped weights that limit the largest bonds
of representing too much of the index.
Rebalancing frequency
The composition of the index is reviewed on a monthly basis. Newly issued bonds that
are eligible for the index will be included the following month after issuance. Monthly
rebalancing is by far the most used in bond indices because the number of bonds that are
issued, called, or matured, is high, at least for larger indices.
5.3.3 Return calculations
These calculation principles are based on the Barclays (2016) Index Methodology15. A
total return index assumes that all coupons are reinvested in the index at the end of the
month. The total return is calculated using the sum of return from price changes, accrued
interest, gain/loss from repayments of principal, and currency value changes.
Bond return






Where Ri is the return for bond i, PB is the value at the beginning of the period and PE
is the value at the end of the period.
15Pages 57-68
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The value at the beginning of the period is calculated as follows:
PB = Ki,B + AIi,B (5.3)
Where Ki,B is the clean price at the beginning of the period, AIi,B is the accrued interest
at the beginning of the period.
The value at the end of the period is:
PE = Ki,E + AIi,E + Ci + PPi (5.4)
Where Ki,E is the clean price at the end of the period, AIi,E is the accrued interest at the
end of the period, Ci is coupon paid during the month and PPi is repayment or paydown
during the month for bond i.
Currency return - unhedged
Currency return is calculated for bonds denominated in SEK, EUR, and USD. It is the
return from converting the local bond to the base currency NOK. It can be calculated










Where SpotE is spot price at the end of the period and, SpotB is the spot price at the
beginning of the period.
By combining equation 5.2 and 5.5 we can express the currency return as:
Currency return = SRi ⇥ (1 +Ri) (5.6)
Where SRi is the return (percentage change in value) for currency i and Ri is the bond
return from equation 5.2.
We see from this equation that the currency return for an unhedged bond is the return in
currency, also called FX appreciation (SRi) plus the return in the currency of the bond
return (SRi ⇥Ri).
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Currency return - hedged
When an investor holds a high yield bond in a different currency, she is exposed to a
substantial risk of currency fluctuations. A Norwegian investor who is looking to speculate
in these currency fluctuations can buy a foreign security if she believes the NOK is going
to depreciate or sell a foreign security if she believes the NOK is going to appreciate over
time. A high yield corporate bond could, in theory, be an example of a security that
could be used for speculation, but as the Nordic high yield market is less liquid than other
markets, we believe that high yield investors are not investing in these bonds to speculate
in the currency market. Therefore, we assume that investors hedge their positions against
currency fluctuations but not the underlying constituent risk. The currency fluctuations
are hedged using one month forward contracts.
When calculating the currency return for a hedged index, we must find the return on
the currency hedge. The currency hedge is one month currency forward on the projected







In equation 5.6 we see that the currency return for the unhedged index is a result of
currency changes and the bond return during the month. This implies that currency risk
cannot be perfectly hedged because the monthly return is unknown at the beginning of
the month. Instead, we can expect the portfolio to grow at a rate that is implied by the
bond yield. To find the expected growth rate, we follow the methods from Barclays (2016)
and Bloomberg indices which set the projected growth rate as follows:







The hedged return is the product of the forward return from equation 5.7 and the expected
growth rate for bond i calculated in equation 5.8:
Hedged return = Forward return⇥Growth rate
Hedged return = FR⇥GR
(5.9)
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Total return
We get the total monthly return by adding the bond return (equation 5.2), currency return
(equation 5.6), and hedge return (equation 5.9).
TRi = Ri + [SRi ⇥ (1 +Ri)] + FR⇥GR (5.10)
The total return for the whole index is the weighted sum of the individual bond returns.
Rindex =
X
Wi + TRi (5.11)
We get the index value at time t by adding the daily total return for the index to the
index value from the day before, t  1:
Indext = Indext 1 ⇥ (1 +Rindex). (5.12)





Where indexB is the index value at the beginning of the period.
In an effort to generate enough observations for robust results, we look at daily index
values instead of end-of-month values, which are more commonly used in performance
analysis. We get the average daily returns by adding all daily returns and dividing them
by the number of trading days in the period. This result, known as the arithmetic mean,
will experience that the power of compound interest will inflate the average daily rate
of return that would have produced the total cumulative return during a period. We
can therefore change the arithmetic mean to a geometric mean, an approach that is also
regarded as the industry standard (Jaquier et al., 2003). The geometric mean of daily




⇧(1 + rt) (5.14)
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with rg being the geometric mean over a period of T days.
Risk calculations
The most common measure of risk and uncertainty for securities is the standard deviation,
otherwise known as volatility (Bhowmik, 2013). We calculate the daily standard deviation
for our indices and their benchmarks as follows:
 d =
p
1/T ⇥ ⌃(rt   r)2 (5.15)
where  d is the daily standard deviation, r is the average daily return, and T is the total
number of days in the period used to calculate the standard deviation. Annualised and
total period standard deviations are measured by multiplying the daily figures by the
square root of the number of trading days in the period.
The tracking error is an indicator of how much the returns of the index swing compared
to its benchmark. It is defined as the standard deviation of the difference in returns
between the index and its benchmark.
 ̂rrel =  (rt   rbt) (5.16)
Risk-free rate
To be considered as an investment option, a portfolio needs to overcome a minimum
hurdle rate, such as the return of a completely safe, liquid investment, otherwise known
as the "risk-free rate". A portfolio’s return minus the risk-free rate is known as the excess
return. As our index and the benchmarks are denominated in Norwegian krone, we use
the synthetic yield on a three-month Norwegian Treasury Bill (otherwise known as a
Statskasseveksel) as a proxy for the risk-free rate, following the approach of Koller et al.
(2015). The rates are obtained from Norges Bank.
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5.3.4 Duration
Macaulay duration, sometimes also referred to as credit duration, is the weighted average






Where PV (Ct) is the present value of the cash flow (coupon) at time t.





Modified duration describes the price sensitivity of a bond due to changes in the interest
rate level. Bonds that have floating interest rates are not very sensitive to interest rate
changes since their modified duration would be the time to the next coupon payment.
This means a modified duration of a maximum of 0.25 when coupons are paid quarterly.
Our eligible green bonds are mostly floating interest bonds which give the index a low
modified duration. Modified duration is therefore not something we will analyze further.
5.3.5 Yield
Yield to maturity (YTM) or yield to worst16 is the interest rate at which the present value










Where Ct is the coupon at time t, FV is the bond’s face value at maturity T .
A good approximation to the average yield for the index can be found by using the






16The earliest call or retirement date.
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High yield corporate bonds tend to be more exposed to defaults and liquidity risk as they
have lower trading frequencies.
5.3.6 Credit spreads
An asset swap is an instrument used for hedging against interest rate risk. It is the
difference between yield to maturity of the bond and the underlying reference rate (Nibor,
Stibor, Euribor, etc.) and is calculated based on the annuity of the present value of the





Where Pibor is the bond value after it is discounted with the -ibor rate, Pi is the price of
the bond and Airs is the -ibor discounted present value of a 1 basis point (bp) coupon
stream.
High yield corporate bonds tend to have lower trading frequencies and a higher chance
of defaulting and are therefore more exposed to liquidity and default risk. Hence, the
expected return is lower than the YTM. When the expected loss increases because of
market conditions or idiosyncratic risk, the investors demand higher compensation, and
therefore a higher spread.
An asset swap spread can be illustrated in the following figure:
Figure 5.1: Asset swap spread, illustration.
Z-spread
Nordic Bond Pricing only provides measures for the average Z-spread. The Z-spread
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also covers credit risk and is very similar to the asset swap spread. The Z-spread is the
constant and static spread that is added to the zero-coupon bonds to discount the bond’s
cash flow so that the discounted cash flow equals the price. The asset swap spread and
the Z-spread does not differ much for bonds with shorter maturities and better credit
quality unless the bond is mispriced (Choudhry, 2005).
5.4 Risk-adjusted returns
In the following section, the methodology used for calculating daily risk-adjusted returns
and confidence intervals is described. rt, rbt and rft are defined as the portfolio return,
benchmark return, and the risk-free asset on day t. T is the total number of trading days
used in the sample period.
When choosing a benchmark index, there are several considerations to take. The most
important being that it is a representation of the Nordic high yield market so that it
becomes a meaningful comparison to our Green Bond Index.
There are very few providers of Nordic high yield bond indices. One of the most widely
used as a benchmark by Nordic high yield funds is Nordic Bond Pricing’s "Norwegian
HY Aggregated Index NOK". This is the benchmark used by, for example, Alfred Berg’s
Nordic High Yield ESG fund that was launched in March 202117. Furthermore, NBP’s
hedged index also serves as a benchmark for DNB’s "Nordic High Yield A" fixed income
fund.
As the Nordics’ biggest provider of bond services, Nordic Bond Pricing is perhaps the
most objective provider of benchmark indices that cover the Norwegian corporate bond
market. We saw from figure 2.1b that Norwegian high yield bonds represent about 59%
of the Nordic high yield market. In addition, the oil-related industries, which are present
mainly in Norway, now make up a smaller share of the market than in previous years.
Less oil-related industries makes the Norwegian bond market more similar to its Nordic
neighbours. Because of the high share of Norwegian bonds in the Northern market, and
because we see that Nordic funds use this index as their benchmark, we believe Nordic
17The authors found that other Nordic HY funds either use a flat hurdle rate as benchmark, or do not
use a benchmark at all.
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Bond Pricing’s index would serve as the most appropriate benchmark for our Green Bond
Index.
DNB also provides an index of high yield bonds covering the Nordic market. This index
is not approved as an authorised benchmark because DNB is not a publicly recognized
index provider due to regulations and their commercial motive. However, investors might
use this index unofficially as it is easily accessible in Bloomberg. As this index covers the
Nordic high yield bond market as a whole, we will also compare the results of our index
to this benchmark.
We argued in section 5.3.3 why we believe investors’ aversion to currency fluctuations
makes hedged indices preferred. We therefore use NBP’s and DNB’s hedged indices as a
comparison to our hedged index.
Green Bond Index Nordic Bond Pricing DNB
Market Nordic countries Norway Nordic
Credit quality High yield High yield High yield
Number of bonds included* 33 210 233
Base currency NOK NOK NOK
Green Bonds Included and Included but Included butlimited to not limited to not limited to
Start date 02/01/2019 02/01/2015 01/10/2015
Average coupon 3.98% 6.07% 6.19%
Average yield 3.89% 7.78% 7.16%
Average duration 3.02 2.36 2.59
Average spread (bp) 369 681 590
(ASW) (Z-spread) (ASW)
*as of April 30th, 2021
Table 5.2: Additional summary of our Green Bond Index and the benchmark indices.
Average coupons, durations, yields, and spreads are calculated for the period January 2nd,
2019 to April 30th, 2021.
5.4.1 Sharpe ratio
The Sharpe ratios are measured using the methodology presented by Lo (2002). The
formula for the daily Sharpe ratio is
cSRd = µ̂rx/ ̂r, (5.22)
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where Rxt is the portfolio excess return rt   rft, µ̂rx is the sample average of index
excess returns, and  ̂r is the sample standard deviation. The same method is used when
calculating the Sharpe ratio of the benchmarks. Annualised and total period Sharpe ratios
are computed by multiplying the daily Sharpe ratio by the root of the number of trading
days at Oslo Stock Exchange in the sample period. There were 251 trading days in 2019,
254 trading days in 2020 and 82 trading days between January 1st, 2021, and April 30th,
2021, which was the last day that we ran the index. For the entire sample period, the
total number of trading days was 587.
cSRa = cSRd ⇥
p
T . (5.23)
This method of annualisation assumes that daily returns have zero autocorrelation and
can therefore only be used as an approximation. However, as it is the most conventional
method of annualising Sharpe ratios, the results are comparable. 95% confidence intervals
around the annualised and total sample Sharpe ratios are computed to understand the
level of uncertainty in the estimates. The formula for this is:




















82(1 + (1/2⇥ cSR
2
d))/T . (5.28)
The confidence interval formula is an asymptotic approximation that is based on the
assumption of normally, independently, and identically distributed daily returns. This
assumption is made for simplicity purposes and to be consistent with the way Sharpe
ratios are annualised using daily data. The critical value of 1.96 is used when calculating
confidence intervals for the other measures of risk-adjusted performance as well.
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5.4.2 Information ratio
The formula for the daily information ratio is:
cIRd = µ̂rrel/ ̂rrel (5.29)
where rrelt is the relative return on day t, rt   rbt, µ̂rrel is the sample average of relative
returns, and  ̂rrel is the daily tracking error. The annualisation and total sample calculation
of daily information ratios, as well as the computing of confidence intervals, are set up
the same way as with the Sharpe ratios.
5.4.3 Jensen’s alpha
The CAPM regression uses consequently the two benchmarks, NBP Norwegian HY
Aggregated Index NOK Hedged and DNB Nordic High Yield Index Hedged as a proxy for
the market portfolio. The regression formula is:
rxt = ↵̂d +  ̂bxt + "t (5.30)
where bxt is the benchmark excess return over the risk-free rate on day t, rbt   rft, and
rxt is the portfolio excess return on day t, rt   rft. Jensen’s alpha is measured on a daily
basis as the intercept of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression:
↵̂d = µ̂rx    ̂µ̂bx (5.31)
where  ̂ is the OLS estimate of the slope coefficient in the regression in equation 5.30, and
µ̂bx is the sample average of benchmark excess returns. The annualised and total period
alphas are calculated by multiplying the daily alpha by the number of trading days in
the respective period. A 95% confidence interval around the annualised and total period
alfas is computed by multiplying the OLS standard error of the intercept in the daily
regression by the number of trading days in the period. To remove any potential influences
of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity on the excess returns used in our regression, we
use the Newey-West procedure (Newey and West, 1987) to create robust standard errors.
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6 Analysis and results
In this section, we present the results from an empirical analysis on the performance of
our Green Bond Index in recent years. Our index will simultaneously work as a proxy for
how ESG affects risk, return, and pricing in fixed income markets. Our main goal is to
test whether ESG-investments can lead to a significant difference in performance between
climate-conscious and regular indices to help motivate green investments in the Nordic
marketplace. We also explore how exposed our index is to periods of turmoil in other
markets compared to more conventional indices. To begin our analysis, we look at how
the index has performed in the market compared to our chosen benchmarks. Then we
study the results of the single-factor CAPM regressions, and furthermore, we look at the
liquidity and credit risk of the Green Bond Index compared to the benchmarks.
6.1 Index and benchmark return
Table 6.1 shows some descriptive statistics of the different indices. Our Green Bond Index
has had a compound annual growth rate of 4.6% over the period between January 1st,
2019 and April 30th, 2021, which is the highest rate of all three indices. When looking at
standard deviations, our index also appears to be less volatile compared to the benchmarks.
As a result, our Green Bond Index has had the highest annualised Sharpe Ratio of the
three.
As we see in table 6.1, the biggest eye-opener isn’t the returns that our index has achieved
since 2019, but that the volatility is markedly lower than that of the benchmarks. It
is worth noting that a possible source of this difference can stem from the difference in
pricing data, previously discussed in section 5.3.1. That being said, this difference in risk
levels makes for some interesting findings once we adjust the returns for volatility.
Figure 6.1 illustrates cumulative returns for the three hedged high yield indices Green
N Mean return Standard deviation CAGR Annualised Sharpe ratio Min Max
Green Bond Index 587 0.018% 0.31% 4.6% 0.84 -4.2% 2.1%
NBP Norwegian HY Index 587 0.018% 0.40% 4.4% 0.70 -3.9% 2.4%
DNB Nordic HY Index 587 0.017% 0.55% 3.9% 0.46 -8.7% 1.5%
Table 6.1: Descriptive index statistics.
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Bond Index, NBP Norwegian HY Index, and DNB Nordic HY Index from January 2019 to
April 2021. The cumulative return for the three indices throughout this period is 11.05%,
10.53%, and 9.39%, respectively. Our index has generated the highest cumulative return
as of April 2021, but the differences between the indices are marginal. However, our
Green Bond Index didn’t drop nearly as much as the other indices during the financial
turbulence caused by the Covid-19 crisis.
Figure 6.1: The cumulative returns of the Green Bond Index and the benchmark indices.
Table 6.2 shows the returns and standard deviations for different time periods. In 2019,
which represents the period before the pandemic, the returns of our Green Bond Index
were 7.78%, an outperformance of 2.75 percentage points against NBP’s index and 2.3
percentage points compared to DNB’s index. It is worth noting that the number of
bonds in the Green Bond Index in 2019 was very limited, which makes us view these
2019 2020 2021
Panel A: Returns
Green Bond Index 7.8% 1.1% 2.0%
NPB Norwegian HY Index 5.0% 0.9% 4.5%
DNB Nordic HY Index 5.5% 0.1% 4.5%
Panel B: Standard deviation
Green Bond Index 1.1% 7.4% 0.3%
NPB Norwegian HY Index 0.9% 9.6% 0.5%
DNB Nordic HY Index 0.9% 13.0% 0.4%
Table 6.2: Annualised index returns and risk by year.
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results with caution. A small number of included bonds can make the index influenced by
idiosyncratic risk and is also a possible answer to why the index had higher volatility than
the benchmarks. In 2020, which represents the period with the most market turmoil and
high levels of volatility, our index achieved a return of 1.06%, which was 0.19 percentage
points better than NBP’s index and one percentage point better than DNB’s index.
In 2021, which represents a time period where markets have started to stabilize, the
cumulative return of our index has stagnated, with a total return of 1.97%, a relative
return of -2.51 percentage points compared to NBP’s index, and -2.49 percentage points
compared to DNB’s index.
6.2 Risk-adjusted return
Table 6.3 presents measures of risk-adjusted return. To make the results comparable
to the other indices, we look at the differences between our index’s Sharpe ratio and
the Sharpe ratio of the benchmarks. This difference is otherwise known as the Sharpe
difference. We observe a positive Sharpe difference compared to both benchmarks for
the total time period, which shows that our index has been able to generate more return
given its level of risk. When we split up our time period into sub-periods, we observe
a significant alpha at the 0.01 level, indicating that the returns are largely driven by
the outperformance at the top of the financial turmoil in 2020. We will discuss possible
reasons for this outperformance further in section 7. The confidence intervals from the
results of the performance analysis can be studied in appendix A7.
We can also look at the information ratio (IR) to get a better understanding of the
outperformance of our index. For the IR to be positive, the relative return of our index
Since inception 2019 2020 2021
Sharpe difference vs NBP HY 0.31 1.49 0.04 -2.59
Sharpe difference vs DNB HY 0.62 1.2 0.12 -4.33
IR GBI vs NBP HY 0.04 1.84 0.03 -5.29
IR GBI vs DNB HY 0.10 1.60 0.11 -6.37
Jensen’s alpha GBI vs NBP HY 0.048 0.075 0.076*** 0.036
Jensen’s alpha GBI vs DNB HY 0.062 0.07 0.07*** 0.024
Table 6.3: Sharpe difference, information ratio and alphas of the Green Bond Index
compared to benchmarks. For the alphas, *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.
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needs to be positive. Our index has achieved an IR of 0.04 against NBP HY and 0.1
against DNB HY, indicating that our index has been able to outperform the benchmarks
on a consistent basis throughout the period. However, in the aftermath of the market
stabilisation, it gets outperformed by both benchmarks. In general, both the Sharpe
difference and IR vary greatly from one year to another, and as a result, caution should
be used when attempting to draw statistically significant conclusions based on these
measures.
Table 6.4 shows the regression table for the entire period. Our index has generated positive
alphas compared to both conventional high yield counterparts. However, the p-values
of both the single-factor regressions were too large for any significant conclusions to be
drawn. Both beta coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Our Green Bond
Index has a beta of 0.51 compared to NBP Norwegian HY and 0.41 compared to DNB
Nordic HY, which are both indicating low levels of systematic risk for our index. However,






NBP Norwegian HY 0.51***
(3.83)
DNB Nordic HY 0.41***
(4.31)





* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 6.4: Main regression table with the daily excess returns of our Green Bond Index
as the dependent variable. The Newey-West procedure is used to create robust standard
errors. The time period is January 2019 to April 2021 (28 months).
To get an understanding of whether our index provided a superior diversification alternative
compared to conventional bonds, we regressed all indexes on the Nordic stock market,
represented by the VINX Benchmark Index. As this equity index consists of a selection of
the largest and most traded Nordic stocks, we concluded that this was a good proxy for the
Nordic equity market. We observe a lower beta coefficient for our index compared to the
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conventional high yield indices throughout the entire period indicating that green bonds
have less correlation with the equity market and is a better diversification alternative.
Looking at R2 we also note that the variation in the bond indices’ excess return cannot
be explained by the equity market. However, the p-values were too high to draw any
significant conclusions. The results from this regression can be studies further in appendix
A6.
6.3 Liquidity and credit risk
This section aims to study the liquidity of the Nordic green bond market and compare
credit risk measures to the benchmark indices. We will dig deeper into the data for our
Green Bond Index to understand what drives liquidity and risk in the green bond market.
As we do not have the constituent weights for the other indices, we cannot compare the
relative spread using the index weights, but in section 6.4.3, we compare the average
spread in DNB’s index and our Green Bond Index.
6.3.1 Yield and credit spread
The asset swap spread and the Z-spread function as a proxy for risk in the sense that it
measures the credit risk associated with bonds. When the spread increases, this means
that the expected credit risk increases. As we see from figure 6.2a, when the financial
markets took a hit at the beginning of March 2020, the spreads doubled in just a month.
The spread measure for Nordic Bond Pricing’s index is the Z-spread as they do not provide
ASW spread measures for their indices. Though the Z-spread and the ASW spread are
not similar measures, they are, in practice, not very different, as explained in section 5.3.6.
As a result, the findings in figure 6.2a gives us an indication of risk but can only be used
as an approximation.
A high average yield indicates that the issuer is of lower credit quality and is more likely to
miss future payments. The high yield is therefore compensation for the exposure to higher
risk. We see from figure 6.2b that the average yield in the Green Bond Index is lower
than in the benchmark indices, which indicates that the green bonds might be a safer
investment. This is consistent with the findings that the Green Bond Index experience
less volatility and modern portfolio theory stating that less risk should be compensated
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(a) EOM ASW spread and Z-spread (bps). (b) EOM average yield.
Figure 6.2: End-of-month spread and yield.
by a lower yield (Markowitz, 1952). We also note that the yield in all indices doubled
from the end of February to the end of March 2020, when uncertainty rose.
Credit risk is an essential component when explaining the yield and the yield spread18
and the correlation of the average spread and average yield for the two securities is 0.93,
0.97, and 0.98 for DNB’s index, NBP’s index, and our Green Bond Index, respectively.
6.3.2 Relative spread
A liquid market will typically have a narrow bid-ask spread, and conversely, an illiquid
market will have a wide spread. To see how the weighted average spread of the green
bonds evolved throughout the time period, we used the relative spread of each bond from




Looking at the result in figure 6.3, we immediately note a sharp increase in spreads when
the Covid-19 crisis hit the market. The spread, which had been stable below 0.80%
throughout 2019, suddenly made a jump to 4.75% in just a few weeks’ time. The spread
continued on a high level until June before it gradually decreased and later stabilised
around 1%.
18The yield spread is the difference between the yield of two securities, often the security of interest
and US treasury bonds.
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Figure 6.3: Relative spread.
The rapid increase and abnormal spread level indicate that the liquidity in the green bond
market dried out and that the securities were challenging to price correctly. Illiquidity is
not uncommon during crashes in financial markets when there is a lot of uncertainty about
the future and hence the security’s fundamental value. During the financial crisis in 2008,
the liquidity in financial markets evaporated quickly. Because many market participants
wanted to get rid of their positions at the same time, and few investors bought new bonds,
the prices fell fast, and the spreads rose. The same happened in March 2020, where the
uncertainty regarding the fundamental value of the green bonds resulted in the wide
spreads we observe in figure 6.3.
We also note the slight increase in spreads at the beginning of November 2020, where
markets were unstable because of the unresolved presidential election in the United States.
When the election was settled, and the testing of Pfizer and BioNTech’s vaccine showed
positive results, the market improved, and spreads got smaller. (Algrøy and Simonsen,
2020)
Table 6.5 shows the correlation coefficients of the relative spread, asset swap spread, and
the yield for the Green Bond Index. We see that there is a high correlation between the
relative spread and the credit risk measures. So even though we do not have the data for
the weighted average relative spread for our benchmarks, we get an idea that the spreads
might have had a similar pattern as we saw in figure 6.2.
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Relative spread ASW spread Yield
Relative spread 1
ASW spread 0.94 1
Yield 0.94 0.98 1
Table 6.5: Correlation coefficients, Green Bond Index.
To better understand the constituents and what was driving the illiquidity in the green
bond market, we looked at the relative spread in the different sectors represented in our
index. Swedish real estate bonds make up a large part of our index19, and the real estate
sector in total made up on average 43% of the index in 202020. To compare the spread,
we therefore first divided the bonds into two groups: real estate and others. Then we
reweighted the weights of all real estate bonds so that the sum of real estate bond weights
equalled 1, and then did the same for the non-real estate bonds.
The result shown in figure 6.4 was surprising. The green real estate bonds had a remarkably
smaller spread during the Covid-19 crisis, and at the very beginning of the crisis they
even had a slight decrease. The spread of non-real estate bonds peaked at the end of
March, where it reached 6.76%. The standard deviation of the spreads tells us that the
variation in the relative spread for the real estate sector is smaller than for the rest of the
bonds. The standard deviation is shown in appendix A9.
Figure 6.4: Relative spread 2020 and 2021.
19See list of included bonds in appendix A4.
20An overview of real estate bonds as a share of the total index can be found in appendix A5
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6.4 Sector composition of the green bond market
The findings in 6.3.2 made us question why we saw such a small decrease in cumulative
returns of our Green Bond Index compared to the benchmarks in 2020. We therefore
wanted to test whether the sector composition and the high share of green real estate
bonds could be the reason for this outperformance, as we saw that the real estate bonds
had a remarkably lower spread.
DNB provides sub-indices for each constituent sector in their index. We collected data for
the relevant DNB sub-indices and rebalanced them to start at 100 at the beginning of the
period, which ensures less jumps when the sector weights change a lot from one month to





where indexnew,j,t is the new rebalanced index value for sector j at time t, indexj,t is
the index value for sector j at time t, and indexj,B is the index value for sector j at the
beginning of the period (2nd of January 2020).
To get the correct sector composition, we used the sector weights from the Green Bond
Index to calculate a reweighted synthetic DNB index. The weights are listed in appendix
A5.
We used the following equation for the final reweighted DNB index:
Indexreweighted =
X
Wj,t ⇥ indexnew,j,t (6.3)
Where Wj,t is the weight of the sector j at time t.
The Green Bond Index consists of a very limited number of bonds in 201921, so we find it
most relevant to study the years 2020 and 2021 for the following analysis. This ensures
that we get more statistically significant and more reliable results that are less affected by
idiosyncratic risk.
21This is also mentioned as a limitation in part 7.1.
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6.4.1 Return
Figure 6.5: Cumulative returns.
Figure 6.5 portraits the cumulative returns of our Green Bond Index compared to the
reweighted DNB Nordic HY Index. Now, we see that the indices follow each other much
more closely than in the analysis in section 6.1. However, there is still an outperformance
during the periods of market turmoil and especially from mid-April to September. When
having the same exposure to all sectors as our Green Bond Index, the DNB Nordic HY
Index has achieved a cumulative return of 3.75% from January 2020 until April 2021, which
is an outperformance of 0.86 percentage points compared to our index. The favourable
standard deviation is also, to a larger degree, erased. In terms of risk-adjusted returns,
the "brown" benchmark has now slightly outperformed our index in terms of Sharpe
ratio, with a Sharpe difference of 0.01 in the period, although this shouldn’t be viewed as
significant. These findings make us question whether the outperformance of our index
can simply be attributed to a higher concentration of the real estate sector and not its
"greenness." This can, in such case, potentially delegitimize the financial performance of
green bonds as an asset class and ESG as a factor in securities pricing. We will discuss
this further in section 7. Although our index has not achieved the same returns as the
reweighted benchmark, it should be noted that the index still has markedly lower levels of
volatility than the benchmark.
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N Mean return Standard deviation Cumulative return Cumulative Sharpe ratio Min Max
Green Bond Index 336 0.009% 0.41% 2.89% 0.39 -4.22% 2.06%
DNB Nordic HY Index Reweighted 336 0.011% 0.51% 3.75% 0.40 -5.66% 1.63%
Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics of our green bond index compared to the new, reweighted
DNB Nordic HY Index from January 2020 until April 2021.
Looking at a linear single-factor regression model with the excess return of the reweighted
DNB Nordic HY index as the independent variable, we observe a much higher beta and






DNB Nordic HY 0.45***
(0.0813)
5.55
DNB Nordic HY Reweighted 0.66***
(0.1168)
5.64





Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
t-statistics in italic
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 6.7: Regression table with daily excess returns of our Green Bond Index as the
dependent variable. The time period is January 2020 to April 2021 (16 months).
6.4.2 Yield and credit spread
When accounting for the sector composition in the Green Bond Index, the reweighted
DNB index gives a very different result from what we saw in 6.3.1. The reweighted index
now has a much lower spread and credit risk than before the reweighting, as shown in
figure 6.7. Though the difference between the two indices is not entirely removed, and
there is still a difference of, on average, 68 bps. The difference tells us that the green bonds
still have a somewhat lower spread, and therefore possibly what some call a "greenium."
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(a) ASW spread and (bps). (b) Average yield.
Figure 6.6: Spread and yield after reweighting DNB’s index.
Figure 6.7: ASW spread for DNB’s index less Green Bond Index before and after
reweighting DNB’s index.
6.4.3 Average relative bid-ask spread
We collected the list of constituent bonds in DNB’s index22 and retrieved historical bid
and ask prices for all bonds. As we did not have each bond’s index weight, we calculated
the average relative spread by taking the sum of all bonds’ relative bid-ask spread si at
each time t, divided by the number of bonds in the index at each time t:





To have an index that matches the sector composition in the Green Bond Index, we
calculated the average relative spread for each sector.
22As of 30th of April 2021. This means that bonds that have matured before this date are not included,
which can potentially bias the result. However, the number of bonds in DNB’s index is much larger than
in the Green Bond Index, so we don’t see this as a major issue.




Number of bondsj, t
(6.5)
Where sj is the average relative spread for sector j at time t, and si,j,t is the relative
spread for bond i in sector j at time t.
Then we used the sector weights of the Green Bond Index, shown in appendix 6.4, to get




Where Wj,t is the weight of sector j at time t.
The result is shown in figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Average relative spread for the Green Bond Index, DNB’s index excluding
oil-related sectors, and DNB’s reweighted index.
We can clearly see that during the market turmoil in 2020, the average relative spread was
lower in the Green Bond Index than in DNB’s index, even when adjusted for the sector
composition. Running a simple regression also shows that this difference is significant.
This evidence strengthens our impression that green bonds are more liquid.
We also get the same impression when we look at the relative spread solely in the real
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estate sector. Even though the standard deviations are quite large, they are lower for the
green bonds than for the bonds included in DNB’s index.
Figure 6.9: Average relative spread for the real estate sector.
Standard deviations for 6.8 and 6.9 can be found in appendix A9.
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7 Discussion
In this chapter, we will discuss and reflect upon the results from section 6. We explain
why the Green Bond Index outperformed the benchmarks during the crisis in 2020, and
displayed lower levels of volatility than the rest of the market over the entire sample
period. Finally, we discuss the limitations of data and the model brought on by this
analysis and the choice of index methodology.
The results show that our hedged Green Bond Index has been unable to generate significant
outperformance over the entire sample period compared to similar hedged high yield
indices. This is in line with what was discovered by, among others, Schröder (2007)
and Ehlers and Packer (2017). In theory, one would expect green bonds to generate
lower returns given the restrictive nature of their investment opportunities and their huge
demand amongst investors. However, in a similar fashion to the research of Nofsinger
and Varma (2014) and Henke (2016), we showed that during the market crash of 2020,
the Green Bond Index held much firmer than the conventional indices, outperforming
them significantly in terms of alpha. This gives us an indication that ESG factors has
an influence on pricing and that in periods of market turmoil, green bonds proves to
be the superior investment alternative in the high yield market. The outperformance
has in the aftermath of the crisis vanished as overall market volatility and uncertainty
have dampened, giving an indication that the downside risk protection only lasts in crisis
periods. At the same time, we find that our Green Bond Index exhibits less volatility
across the entire period compared to the rest of the market, also in line with the findings
of Ehlers and Packer (2017), as well as Medda and Partridge (2018).
When considering the results from section 6.4 where we reweighted DNB’s index, we see
that the sector composition might be the key to explaining a large part of the green bonds’
resilience during the Covid-19 crisis. The Green Bond Index contains a large share of
real estate bonds, and the index is overly exposed to this sector when compared to the
Nordic high yield market in total. As the real estate sector experienced less volatility,
loss of return, and less illiquidity during the crises, our index is largely driven by these
properties. Though adjusting for the sector composition, the green bonds still show that
the market accepts a lower credit spread than the benchmark.
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A possible explanation might be that the green bond market exhibits greater liquidity,
which in crises makes the bonds an attractive investment. In periods of crisis, investors
face the risk of overstepping the capital buffers imposed by the government. The superior
liquidity-feature of green bonds, mostly stemming from the huge demand among investors,
would lessen the risk, as green bonds would be easier to sell. We saw in figure 6.4 that
the real estate sector appears to carry greater liquidity by having a lower relative bid-ask
spread. Investors might therefore be willing to pay a premium for liquid bonds and accept
a lower yield. Friewald’s (2011) study on the high yield market in the US shows that
bonds have a stronger reaction to changes in liquidity and are more exposed to liquidity
risk during financial crises. If Friewald’s result is also applicable for the Nordic market,
this can explain why the average yield for the green bonds is lower even when correcting
for sector differences.
Another explanation can be that issuers of green bonds have a higher credit quality
than non-issuers. Green bond issuance is a costly process, so the net benefit of paying
a potentially slightly lower coupon, the cost of frequently reporting climate measures,
and having a third party supplying a second opinion is not necessarily positive. If the
companies that can afford to bear this cost are already the best-performing companies
in the high yield segment, the index will give a too optimistic result. In addition, when
the market is in an emerging phase, the issuers with lower risk might be over-represented.
Thus, the outperformance would not be a result of the bonds being green but a result of
the issuers being top of their class.
The high p-values when regressing our index against the re-weighted benchmark confirm
our conclusion of insignificant differences in performance across the entire time period.
Ergo, we do not have enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no significant
outperformance of green bonds compared to the overall high yield market. The results
from the CAPM regression show that our index has generated a positive alpha compared
to the benchmarks. However, considering its small size, the alpha shows that there is
not a big difference in performance. In addition, our model does not include the widely
accepted Fama-French three and five-factor models (Fama and French, 2004) or the
momentum factor presented by Carhart (1997). The absence of these models means that
several risk factors might be omitted and that our alpha simply can be the result of
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our index’s exposure to these factors. We also do not have enough evidence to reject
the null hypothesis of significant outperformance in periods of market crisis. This can
be attributed to the fact that as of May 2021, we are still in the recession caused by
the Covid-19 crisis. As a result, any effort to divide the sample period into a crisis and
non-crisis period, as per the methodology of Nofsinger and Varma (2014) and Henke
(2016), would be useless, as the entire sample period would be regarded as a crisis period.
Any attempt to divide the sample period based on subjective assessments could also result
in biased or skewed conclusions. However, during the worst periods of the pandemic,
the Sharpe ratios, declined volatility levels, increased liquidity, and reduced asset swap
spreads compared to the conventional market tell a story of an asset class that could have
the potential to be very attractive for investors in future periods of market turmoil.
The green bond market will be interesting to follow when new regulations are established
and we believe that there are few limits to the growth of the asset class. As the market
moves forward and more green bonds are issued, one could potentially see a more diverse
group of issuers, which could increase the bonds’ liquidity even further as they are traded
more often. Also, the number of investors having ESG-investments in their mandate will
probably continue to grow exponentially, and so will the demand for green bonds.
The future for the asset class is bright, especially as we get closer to 2050. However,
only time will tell whether the green bond label will in fact reduce investors’ exposure to
environmentally-related financial risks. One thing that speaks against this is that exposure
to these types of risks is dependent of the entire company’s business. When holders of
green bonds increase their exposure to companies with high ESG-scores, they also have a
claim on the entire company’s operations, and not just the parts considered sustainable.
In other words, the investor is still exposed to environmental risk, like for instance stricter
carbon regulation, if holding green bonds of companies deemed "brown." However, as
the upcoming EU taxonomy and green bond standard is implemented, it will bring on
new principles for the issuance of green bonds and reporting of sustainability. When this
happens, knowledge regarding precisely which environmental risk factors companies are
exposed to will also increase. This knowledge will be key for asset owners and managers
wanting to manage these risks and use green bonds to hedge them effectively.
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7.1 Limitations of the thesis
Nordic Bond Pricing is not basing their index on bid prices like the majority of the index
providers we have used as guides. Instead, they use an "evaluated market price ("EVAL"),
usually considered as a mid price" (Nordic Bond Pricing, 2020). When comparing our
index to Nordic Bond Pricing’s index in periods of wide spreads, the mid price will be
very different from the bid price. This means that during the Covid-19 crisis in 2020, the
NBP index might seem to perform better than our Green Bond Index and DNB’s index.
Using bid prices was a very thoughtful choice we made in order for the index to be
comparable to an investor’s portfolio. When mid prices are used, a portfolio of bonds will
appear to be less profitable when spreads increase compared to an index using bid prices.
While experiencing tremendous growth, the high yield green bond market is still small in
size. As a result, the number of bonds included in our index is very limited. This has
implications in the sense that unsystematic risk might bias our index results as small
company-specific events are not a representation of market movement. This is especially
important when interpreting the results for 2019, where the number of bonds is  12, and
is the reason why the year 2019 is not included further in our analysis after we reweighted
the benchmark. The issue of a small market becomes less important if the green bond
market develops and matures.
It should also be emphasized that as the Nordic green bond market is still emerging, it
might be too early to draw any definite conclusions on the performance of green bonds
compared to their conventional counterparts. The true long-term value of investing
in green bonds will, in our opinion, not be revealed after new regulations have been
implemented or physical climate change risks have taken place. That being mentioned,
the performance of the green bond market so far is still interesting because it describes
how this asset class perform during a crisis.
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8 Concluding remarks
In order to make financial flows consistent with the pathway towards a low-carbon society
and climate-resilient development, major investments in sustainable projects are needed.
One relatively new way of financing these projects is through issuing green bonds, where
the proceeds are earmarked for environmental-friendly projects. However, despite a rapidly
increasing demand for green bonds in recent years, there is still uncertainty regarding
the financial benefits of the asset class and how they compare to their conventional
counterparts.
In this thesis, we examine the Nordic high yield green bond market. While previous
papers have mostly focused on the existence of a potential green bond premium and found
results similar to us, this thesis contribute to the literature by creating and backdating an
index from 2019 until today and focusing on the asset class’ performance in the secondary
market over time. Using a CAPM framework and well-known methods of performance
evaluation, we analyse the index’s performance relative to appropriate benchmarks to see
if the green bonds outperform the conventional bond market. Extending the analysis, we
control for sector composition in the green bond market by comparing the Green Bond
Index to a reweighted benchmark index. Furthermore, the relative bid-ask spread is used
as a measure of liquidity to study the liquidity differences, both within the green bond
market and compared to the reweighted benchmark. For the performance analysis, we
had two hypotheses that we wanted to explore. The first hypothesis of the thesis was that
the Green Bond Index would outperform the benchmark in terms of risk-adjusted returns
and better liquidity. The second hypothesis stated that green bonds would hold up better
during the market turmoil caused by the Covid-19 crisis.
The regression results from the analysis brought by this thesis showed that the Green
Bond Index outperformed the benchmarks during 2020, with an alpha of 7.6% against
NBP Norwegian HY Index and 7% against DNB Nordic HY Index. Both alphas were
significant at the 1% level. However, when having the same exposure to the constituent
sectors, the alpha for the Green Bond Index was no longer significant. However, we
observed that the index had a much quicker recovery. In the months following the 2020
market crash, the index displayed lower levels of volatility, lower credit spreads, and better
68
liquidity throughout the period. In general, we observe that our index outperformed the
market in the aftermath of the stock market crash caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Again, the results of this study were insignificant. Based on this, it is hard to draw any
significant conclusions regarding whether Nordic high yield green bonds have performed
differently throughout the sample period. We can therefore not reject the null hypotheses
of no significant outperformance.
Due to the different characteristics of markets in other geographical locations, one should
be careful to conclude that the results from this study are transferable to other countries.
Green bonds, in for instance emerging markets, could display entirely different risk and
return characteristics and would raise opportunities for some interesting future research.
Also, due to limitations in our data set, the Nordic green bond market will be interesting
for future research when the market matures, as it is still too early to draw any significant
conclusion on the performance of green bonds compared to conventional bonds. By this
time, a lot more regulations and climate shocks will have taken place, which both have
the potential to reveal the true value of green bonds.
This study focuses solely on the green bond market. However, as mentioned in section
2.2.1, green bonds are not the only type of sustainability bond. Social bonds have also
surged in recent years, with the proceeds being earmarked for projects mitigating social
issues like health care, education, or equality. These bonds are not subject to the same
risk characteristics as green bonds23, and the analysis of how this market has performed
would therefore make for some highly interesting research.
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A1 Sector composition in the Nordic high yield market
Figure A1.1: Nordic high yield sector composition 2020 (Nordic Trustee, 2021).
Figure A1.2: Nordic green bond high yield sector composition 2020 (Nordic Trustee,
2021).
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A2 Bond Ratings
Risk Moody’s Standard & Poor’s Fitch Grade
Lowest Risk Aaa AAA AAA
Investment GradeLow Risk Aa AA AALow Risk A A A
Medium Risk Baa BBB BBB
High Risk Ba,B BB,B BB/B
High YieldHighest Risk Caa/Ca/C CCC/CC/C CCC/CC/C
Default C D D
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Nordic market
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Table A3.1: The Nordic Green Bond Market as of April 30th 2021.
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A4 Green bonds included in the index
Issuer ISIN Country Sector Issue date Maturity
SCATEC ASA NO0010809684 Norway Utilities 17/11/2017 17/11/2021
KLOVERN AB SE0011063163 Sweden Real estate 04/04/2018 04/04/2022
AB STENA METALL FINANS NO0010823362 Norway Industry 01/06/2018 01/06/2023
FASTPARTNER AB SE0011974351 Sweden Real estate 30/11/2018 30/05/2022
SAMHALLSBYGGNADSBOLAGET SE0012256741 Sweden Real estate 14/02/2019 14/02/2024
KUNGSLEDEN AB SE0011869692 Sweden Real estate 07/03/2019 07/03/2023
BASELOAD CAPITAL SE0011923267 Sweden Investment comp. 22/03/2019 22/03/2023
MILLICOM INTL CELLULAR SE0012454841 Sweden TMT 15/05/2019 15/05/2024
EUROPEAN ENERGY AS DK0030448238 Denmark Utilities 20/06/2019 20/09/2023
RE IV LTD SE0012741064 Sweden Real estate 05/07/2019 05/07/2022
ALTERA SHUTTLE TANKERS NO0010866163 Norway Transportation 18/10/2019 18/10/2024
OFFENTLIGA HUS I NORDEN SE0013042611 Sweden Real estate 27/09/2019 27/03/2023
MOWI ASA NO0010874050 Norway Seafood 31/01/2020 31/01/2025
CIBUS NORDIC RE AB SE0014453130 Sweden Real estate 12/06/2020 12/06/2023
GRIEG SEAFOOD ASA NO0010885007 Norway Seafood 25/06/2020 25/06/2025
MOMOX HOLDING GMBH NO0010886369 Norway TMT 10/07/2020 10/07/2025
K2A KNAUST ANDERSSON SE0014731071 Sweden Real estate 28/08/2020 28/08/2023
ARWIDSRO FASTIGHETS SE0013719606 Sweden Real estate 04/09/2020 04/09/2023
BONAVA AB SE0013887973 Sweden Real estate 11/09/2020 11/03/2024
BONHEUR ASA NO0010893332 Norway Utilities 22/09/2020 22/09/2025
NP3 FASTIGHETER SE0014956686 Sweden Real estate 23/09/2020 05/01/2024
NIVIKA FASTIGHETER AB SE0014855763 Sweden Real estate 24/09/2020 24/09/2023
MAGNOLIA BOSTAD AB SE0014956454 Sweden Real estate 02/10/2020 02/04/2024
OFFENTLIGA HUS I NORDEN SE0014965919 Sweden Real estate 12/10/2020 12/04/2024
SIBS AB SE0014965729 Sweden Real estate 19/10/2020 19/04/2024
KLOVERN AB SE0013104205 Sweden Real estate 16/10/2020 16/04/2024
COREM PROPERTY GRP AB SE0015192521 Sweden Real estate 29/10/2020 29/04/2024
RE IV LTD SE0015195847 Sweden Real estate 27/11/2020 27/11/2023
AKER HORIZONS AS NO0010923220 Norway Investment comp. 03/02/2021 15/08/2025
KLOVERN AB SE0013104361 Sweden Real estate 10/02/2021 10/02/2025
SCATEC ASA NO0010931181 Norway Utilities 19/02/2021 19/08/2025
KUNGSLEDEN AB SE0013882941 Sweden Utilities 30/03/2021 30/03/2028
MAGNOLA BOSTAD AB SE0015659636 Sweden Real estate 18/03/2021 18/03/2025
Table A4.1: List of included bonds.
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A5 Sector composition in the Green Bond Index
Note that even though the number of bonds is 32 in April 2021, the total number of bonds
included in the index is 33. This is because one of the Scatec bonds are excluded from
the index at the end of November 2020.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































82 A6 Regression table: The Nordic high yield market vs the Nordic equity market
A6 Regression table: The Nordic high yield market vs







Vinx Benchmark Cap 0.0014 0.0356 0.0703
(0.04) (0.86) (1.05)
Intercept (↵) 0.00016 0.00013 0.00009
(1.12) (0.59) (0.30)
N 587 587 587
R2 0.00 0.01 0.02
t-statistics in parenthesis
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A6.1: Regression table with the daily excess return of the VINX equity index as
the independent variable and the bond indices as the dependent variable.
The Newey-West procedure is used to create robust standard errors. The time period is
January 2019 to April 2021 (28 months).
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Since inception 2019 2020 2021

















































Table A7.1: Performance analysis results
Values for Sharpe ratios, information ratios and alpha along with confidence intervals,
since inception (cumulative), and for the different time segments (annualised). For the
alphas, *** indicates a significance at the 0.01 level.
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Figure A8.1: Standard deviation of the bid-ask spread.
A9 Standard deviation of the average relative bid-ask spread 85
A9 Standard deviation of the average relative bid-ask
spread
(a) Standard deviation of the average relative spread for the sector weighted
DNB index and the Green Bond Index.
(b) Standard deviation of the average relative spread for the real estate bonds
in DNB’s index and the Green Bond Index.
Figure A9.1: Standard deviation of the average relative spread.
